The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: Time to Take the Final Leap? by Olicker, Maury R.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
5-1-1988
The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony:
Time to Take the Final Leap?
Maury R. Olicker
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Maury R. Olicker, The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony: Time to Take the Final Leap?, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 831 (1988)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol42/iss4/3
The Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony:
Time to Take the Final Leap?
I. INTRODUCTION .... ....................................................... 831
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE .............................................. 834
III. ANALYSIS ................................................................ 839
A. Exclusion Based on "Common Knowledge" ......................... 839
B. Exclusion Based on "Ultimate Issue of Fact" Testimony................ 848
I. THEORY OF THE RULE AND OBJECTIONS TO IT ..................... 848
2. HISTORY OF THE RULE .. ......................................... 850
3. FEDERAL CASES UNDER RULE 704 ................................ 855
C. Exclusion Based on "Conclusion of Law" Testimony .................... 862
1. THEORY OF THE RULE ............................................ 862
2. CASE ANALYSIS ................................................... 864
a. Witness Tries to State the Law ............................ 865
b. Witness States a Factual Conclusion Using Legally Defined Words. 871
c. Witness States a Conclusion Employing Legal Criteria ............ 875
D. Exclusion of Testimony Under Rule 704(b) ............................ 882
IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF EXCLUSION ............................. 885
A. Theory of the Final Leap ........................................... 885
B. Source of the Legal Standard ........................................ 892
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................... 893
I. INTRODUCTION
"Objection! The witness is usurping the function of the jury."
"The witness is encroaching on the role of the court." Attorneys have
recited these familiar assertions for years as shorthand ways of calling
for the exclusion of expert witness testimony. In more specific varia-
tions, litigators have tried to prevent expert witnesses from expressing
opinions that jurors were capable of reaching on their own, from
offering conclusions that addressed the ultimate issue of fact, from
stating the law, or from applying legal standards to the evidence.
Although the viability of these objections in the federal courts
was somewhat uncertain under common law, it is tempting to believe
that the unresolved questions were settled by the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The common notion is that Rules 702 and 704 block objec-
tions to expert opinions on issues of fact but that experts may not
express opinions on issues of law. This formula approximates but
greatly oversimplifies reality. Judges have struggled with the policy
implications and limits of the expert witness rules. Old concerns that
may not be consistent with the intentions embodied in the new rules
have continued to exert noticeable influence. The courts have
encountered particular difficulty trying to articulate admissibility
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standards for expert opinions that combine elements of fact and law.
In short, the truth is much more complex and subtle than the carica-
ture, and it is worthy of investigation.
This Comment discusses the kinds of opinions that may be
expressed by expert witnesses and admitted into evidence pursuant to
the Federal Rules of Evidence. It attempts to determine: First, the
specific principles that guide courts in their decisions to admit or
exclude expert opinion at trial; second, whether these principles have
been uniformly applied; and third, whether these principles should be
modified. The inquiry is limited to situations in which a party argues
that an expert's opinion should not be admitted into evidence because
the expert would be overstepping his proper role as a witness and
interfering with the functioning of the court in its role as the exclusive
authority on the law or the jury in its role as the exclusive trier of fact.
Expert testimony and opinion evidence are inextricably linked
and considered together in article VII of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but they are not the same thing. The more general of the two
areas of discussion, known at common law as the "opinion rule,"
deals with statements by witnesses that are classified as "opinions"
rather than as "facts."' Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, opin-
ions may be stated either by lay persons 2 or by experts, 3 although
different criteria for admissibility are applied to the two classes of
witnesses.
An expert witness was defined at common law as a "man of sci-
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that evidence is admitted for the purpose of
proving facts:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 401. "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
Rules 701 to 705 provide specific conditions for the admission of testimony in the form of
opinion. Thus, opinion is implicitly different from facts, and the structure of the Federal Rules
of Evidence presumes that the purpose of opinion evidence is to assist the trier of fact in the
determination of matters of fact. The premise that opinion testimony is admitted into evidence
for the purpose of supporting the determination of facts is also explicitly stated in Rules 701
and 702.
2. FED. R. EvID. 701. Under Rule 701, any witness who "is not testifying as an expert"
is a lay witness and may state opinions only if they are (a) "rationally based on the perception
of the witness" and (b) helpful to understanding the witness' testimony or determining a fact at
issue. Id.
3. FED. R. EvID. 702. Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
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ence; a person conversant with the subject-matter; a person of skill; a
person possessed of science or skill respecting the subject-matter; one
who has made the subject upon which he gives his opinion a matter of
particular study, practice or observation."4 The Federal Rules of Evi-
dence define an expert witness as one "qualified .. .by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education. ' 5 Experts may testify "in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."6 The advisory committee's note to
Rule 702 makes it clear that expert testimony may be factual in
nature.7 In fact, the note encourages expert testimony in "nonopinion
form."
8
It is not clear whether article VII of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence was intended to break new ground. Judge Jack Weinstein,9 a
leading commentator on the Federal Rules of Evidence, has
remarked:
Although Rule 702 is a codification of existing federal case
law, it has been pushed to center stage by the innovations in the
other rules dealing with expert testimony: Rule 703's expansion of
the data on which the expert may rely, Rule 704's abolition of the
ultimate issue rule, and Rule 705's loosening of foundational
requirements.I°
Judge George Pratt, Judge Weinstein's colleague on the bench of
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, sees article VII more as an effort to consolidate existing case
law than to make a revolutionary change:
With little discussion, Congress adopted the opinions rules in
nearly the same form as the advisory committee proposed. Such
easy acceptance is perhaps understandable since the rules reflect an
enlightened, academic view of opinion testimony that dates back
4. B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES § 368, at 687 (4th ed. 1938)
(quoting Pridgen v. Gibson, 194 N.C. 289, 292, 139 S.E. 443, 445 (1927)).
5. FED. R. EVID. 702.
6. Id.
7. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (1973).
8. The note says in part:
Most of the literature assumes that experts testify only in the form of
opinions. The assumption is logically unfounded. The rule accordingly
recognizes that an expert on the stand hiay give a dissertation or exposition of
scientific or other principles relevant to the case, leaving the trier of fact to apply
them to the facts. Since much of the criticism of expert testimony has centered
upon the hypothetical question, it seems wise to recognize that opinions are not
indispensable and to encourage the use of expert testimony in nonopinion form
when counsel believes the trier can itself draw the requisite inference.
FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (1973).
9. Chief Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
10. 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[01], at 702-6 (1987)
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter J. WEINSTEIN].
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some fifty years. The lack of discussion is somewhat surprising,
however, when one considers the persistence, frequency, and suc-
cess of attorneys' objections to opinion testimony since the adop-
tion of the Rules, objections made on the very grounds that Article
VII sought to undercut."
The discussion that follows is limited to the subject matter and
phrasing of expert witness opinion testimony. It does not deal with
objections on grounds relating to the qualification of the witness, 2 the
bases on which the expert may rely, 13 or the requirements for disclo-
sure of facts or data underlying expert opinion.1 4 It also does not
consider objections to testimony regarding the credibility of other
witnesses, 15
Section II of this Comment examines briefly the historical back-
ground of opinion evidence and expert witness testimony. The discus-
sion in Section III considers in detail objections to testimony based on
the common law rules barring testimony that is within the common
knowledge of ordinary persons, testimony that reaches the ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact, and testimony that states con-
clusions of law. It also considers objections based on the statutory
rule barring expert witness testimony as to whether a criminal defend-
ant had the mental state constituting an element of a crime or a
defense.1 6 In Section IV, this Comment proposes a unified theory to
explain the underlying bases of judicial decisions that admit or
exclude expert opinions. The concluding discussion in Section V sup-
ports Judge Pratt's observation that trial practice in this area has not
changed to the extent intended by the drafters of the Federal Rules of
Evidence,' 7 and it suggests a new interpretation of Rule 704 that, if
implemented, may result in trial practice that more truly reflects the
perceived intention of the drafters.
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The opinion rule apparently does not have a very long history.
Professor John Wigmore observed that traditional English common
11. Pratt, A Judicial Perspective on Opinion Evidence Under the Federal Rules, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 313, 314 (1982) (footnotes omitted).
12. FED. R. EvID. 702.
13. FED. R. EVID. 703.
14. FED. R. EVID. 705.
15. For a discussion of the admissibility of expert witness opinion testimony relating to the
credibility of other witnesses in cases involving the sexual misuse of children, see Comment,
Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases Involving the Sexual Misuse of a
Child, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033 (1988).
16. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
17. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
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law had no notion that opinion testimony was either proper or
improper.1 8 Among the well-known English commentators whose
writings apparently had nothing to say about the rule were Chief
Baron Gilbert 9 and Justice Buller.20 The evidence treatise of Jeremy
Bentham appears to have made no comment on the opinion rule and
it mentions expert witnesses only in connection with the authentica-
tion of handwriting.2
In its original form, the opinion rule was an offshoot of the
requirement that a witness base his testimony only on personal know-
ledge.22 Modem commentators point to Lord Coke's declaration in
1622-that it "is not satisfactory for a witness to say that he thinks or
persuadeth himself"-as an early statement of the personal knowl-
edge rule, although the statement itself was later misinterpreted as
indicating disapproval of opinion testimony.23 Dean Mason Ladd has
pointed out that the rule against hearsay arose also from the personal
knowledge rule. Thus, the opinion rule and the hearsay rule are lineal
cousins. 24
The use of skilled witnesses, however, was an exception to the
personal knowledge rule. Wigmore cites a case as early as 1353 in
which surgeons who had not witnessed the incident causing an injury
were called to testify whether the wound was caused by "mayhem. "25
This was not considered a contradiction to the general personal
knowledge rule because experts had the status of "helper to the
18. 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1917, at 1 (J. Chadbourn
rev. 1978) [hereinafter J. WIGMORE 1978]. Throughout this Comment, Professor Wigmore's
treatise is cited in a historical context, with reference to the views on opinion evidence that he
expressed in the first edition of his work, published in 1904. 4 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 1917-1921
(1904) [hereinafter J. WIGMORE 1904]. For the convenience of the reader, citations to the
Wigmore treatise refer to the Chadbourn revision, currently in print, wherever possible. In
every instance, if the Chadbourn revision is cited, the first edition also supports the assertion
for which the Chadbourn revision is cited as authority. The section numbers are identical in
both editions for all citations. If differences between the two editions are material to an
assertion in this Comment, the first edition is cited, with a notation describing the difference
between the two editions and a citation to the Chadboum revision.
19. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1917, at 1.
20. Id.
21. 3 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 598-608 (1827 & photo. reprint
1978).
22. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1917, at 1-2.
23. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 415 (1952) (quoting Adams v. Canon,
I Dyer 53b n.15, 73 Eng. Rep. 117 n.15 (K.B. 1622)). There are slight textual differences
between the two sources.
24. Id. at 415.
25. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1917, at 3 (citing J. THAYER, CASES ON
EVIDENCE 673 (2d ed. 1900) (which cited 28 Liber Assisarum fo. 145a, pl. 5 (1353-1354))).
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court."2 6 They testified directly to the judge, not to the jury. As pro-
cedures evolved, by the late 1700's the expert witness became a "mere
witness to the jury," a development that presented the English courts
with a doctrinal conflict: How could an expert state his opinion to the
jury if he did not have personal knowledge of the facts of the case?27
Lord Mansfield solved this problem in a 1782 case, Folkes v.
Chadd,28 by equating the expert's general knowledge in his field of
expertise with personal knowledge of facts.29 At issue was the testi-
mony of an engineer as to why a harbor had filled up:
It is objected that Mr. Smeaton is going to speak, not as to facts,
but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced from facts
which are not disputed-the situation of banks, the course of tides
and of winds, and the shifting of sands .... I cannot believe that
where the question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or an
artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be
received .... The cause of the decay of the harbor is also a matter
of science .... Of this, such men as Mr. Smeaton alone can judge.
Therefore we are of opinion that his judgment, formed on facts,
was very proper evidence.3°
This decision apparently settled the matter of admission of expert tes-
timony in cases in which the witness did not have personal knowledge
of the facts of the case.31
Meanwhile, according to Wigmore, although English and Ameri-
can courts traditionally admitted the "opinions, conclusions, or infer-
ences of the ordinary lay witness when he came properly equipped
with a basis of 'facts,' of personal observation, 31 2 a counter trend
began in the early 1700's to instruct the jury to disregard the opinions
of lay and expert witnesses, even if based on personal knowledge, if
the jurors were equally capable of reaching a conclusion for them-
selves, based on the evidence presented. 33 In the early 1800's, as testi-
mony of expert witnesses without personal knowledge of the case
increasingly gained acceptance, judges began to bar lay witnesses
from stating opinions that the court considered superfluous to the
decision of the jury."
26. Id.
27. Id. at 4.
28. 3 Dougl. 157, 49 Eng. Rep. 589 (K.B. 1782), quoted in J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note
18, § 1917, at 4. The quotation in J. WIGMORE 1978 has minor editing differences.
29. Folkes, 3 Dougl. at 159-60, 49 Eng. Rep. at 590.
30. Id.
31. J. WIGMORE 1978,.supra note 18, § 1917 at 4-5.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id. at 7.
34. Id. at 8.
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In the United States in particular, courts began to exclude lay
witness opinion testimony much more broadly during the nineteenth
century. "Instead of following the English approach of prohibiting
statements of belief not drawn from personal observation, the Ameri-
can courts attempted the impossible task of admitting 'facts' while
prohibiting all 'inferences, conclusions or opinions' without regard to
whether they were rooted in observation."35
Wigmore, writing in 1904, tried to reverse this trend. He sum-
marized a new theory of the opinion rule, as he saw it:
[W]herever inferences and conclusions can be drawn by the jury as
well as by the witness, the witness is superfluous, and thus an
expert's opinion is received because and whenever his skill is
greater than the jury's, while a lay opinion is received because and
whenever his facts cannot be so told as to make the jury as able as
he to draw the inference.36
Wigmore advocated a very simple and very flexible rule: Any
evidence that provides the jury with useful information it could not
otherwise obtain should be admitted, regardless of whether it is opin-
ion, but any evidence the jury does not need should be excluded.37
Thus, Wigmore apparently advocated excluding evidence that dupli-
cated the "common knowledge" of the jury, but he decried as "erro-
neous theories" rules in common application at the time that excluded
evidence because it was opinion as opposed to fact,3" because it
"usurp[ed] the function of the jury,"3 9 or because it addressed the
"very issue before the jury. ' 4°
Wigmore was both prescient and influential. Weinstein reports
that by the 1940's, there was a trend in many jurisdictions toward
disregarding the orthodox rule excluding lay opinion testimony.4 In
1942, the American Law Institute promulgated the Model Code of
Evidence, which provided that a witness may testify to what he has
perceived in terms that include inferences unless he can communicate
his perceptions equally well without inferences and the statement of
inferences would tend to mislead the jury.42
35. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 701[01], at 701-4.
36. J. WIGMORE 1904, supra note 18, § 1917, at 2549. Nearly identical text appears in the
Chadbourn revision. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1917, at 10.
37. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1918, at 11-12.
38. Id. § 1919, at 14-17.
39. Id. § 1920, at 18-21.
40. Id. § 1921, at 21-26.
41. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 701[01], at 701-6 (citing MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
introductory note to chapter V (1942)).
42. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 401 (1942). For a discussion of Rule 401, see J.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 701[01], at 701-7 & n.20.
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In 1952, Dean Ladd's widely cited article on expert testimony
reported that the use of expert testimony had greatly expanded,
largely as a result of great advances in scientific knowledge and meth-
ods of scientific proof. 3 In addition to noting many specific areas of
inquiry that had proven fruitful for the consideration of expert opin-
ions," Ladd pointed out that experts were still not likely to be heard
by the jury if the subject of inquiry fell within the common knowledge
of laymen. 45  He also observed that expert evidence that could be
advanced with great scientific certainty would be highly respected by
courts, in some cases meriting even a directed verdict based on the
expert's opinion.4 6 Expert testimony more speculative in nature, how-
ever, was less likely to be admitted.47 Ladd noted as well that the
doctrine requiring exclusion of opinions on the issue of ultimate fact
for jury decision, although discredited by commentators, was still
widely observed by the courts.48
Against this background, it is tempting to view article VII of the
Federal Rules of Evidence as an attempt to make a clean sweep of the
common law doctrines that had grown up around expert and opinion
testimony and replace them with the single, simple standard advo-
cated by Wigmore: Evidence will be admitted if and only if it assists
the jury in reaching its determination of fact. As Judge Pratt points
out, "Article VII ... is concise; its opinion rules appear to be simple
and direct."4 9 The remainder of this Comment tests that proposition
by identifying the objections to expert opinion testimony that were
raised frequently at common law and determining how those objec-
tions have fared in courts applying the Federal Rules of Evidence.5
43. Ladd, supra note 23, at 417.
44. Id. at 417-18. Among the inquiries specified by Ladd were blood analysis to determine
paternity or intoxication, comparative analysis of handwriting, fingerprints, and bullets, and
expert opinions on such questions as whether a witness was a pathological liar, whether a trade
practice was misleading to the public, whether a writing was literature and whether a painting
was art. Id.
45. Id. at 419.
46. Id. at 420-21. Ladd stated that in a paternity action an expert opinion, based on a
blood test, that a man is not the father of a child should merit a directed verdict despite all
other evidence to the contrary. Id. at 421.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 424.
49. Pratt, supra note 11, at 313-14.
50. Among the most frequently heard objections are that the witness is "invading the
province of the jury," or "usurping the function of the jury." These phrases imply that the
witness is personally deciding the case, leaving no role for the jury. As many commentators
observe, the argument is a logical absurdity because the jury is always free to ignore or weigh
expert testimony as it sees fit. See, e.g., J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1920, at 18-21.
Because the two phrases have no uniformly applied meaning and always overlap with the
[Vol. 42:831
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III. ANALYSIS
A. Exclusion Based on "Common Knowledge"
It stands to reason that if an expert is permitted to state his opin-
ion to the jury because his scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the jury, then, conversely, he should not state
opinions on matters of which his knowledge is no greater than what
might be expected of the average juror. This simple proposition con-
stitutes the basis of the common law exclusion of expert testimony
that is within the common knowledge of the lay person.
Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts pointed out that a witness
who told the jury what it could figure out for itself was, in effect,
usurping the role of the finder of fact, a concern that runs through all
the cases considered in this Comment:
Now, when th[e] experience [of the expert witness] is of such a
nature that it may be presumed to be within the ,common experi-
ence of all men of common education, moving in the ordinary
walks of life, there is no room for the evidence of opinion; it is for
the jury to draw the inference. It is not because a man has a repu-
tation for superior sagacity and judgment and power of reasoning
that his opinion is admissible. If so, such men might be called in
all cases to advise the jury, and it would change the mode of trial.5
Wigmore posited that the opinion rule was based on "the exclu-
sion of supererogatory evidence." 52 By excluding expert testimony,
Wigmore said, the court was telling the witness, "The tribunal is on
this subject in possession of the same materials of information as
yourself; thus, as you can add nothing to our materials for judgment,
your further testimony is unnecessary, and merely cumbers the
proceedings."53
The Supreme Court of the United States issued a curious pair of
decisions in 1877 and 1878, in which it first applied the common
knowledge rule in a conventional manner and then appeared to apply
it contrary to the conventional application. Milwaukee & St. Paul
meanings of other commonly used objections, they are not discussed here as such. Suffice it to
say that one or the other of these objections arises in many of the cases cited in this Comment.
51. New England Glass Co. v. Lovell, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 319, 321 (1851), quoted in J.
MCKELVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 134 n.17 (1907).
52. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1918, at 11. The word "supererogatory" means,
"observed or performed to an extent not enjoined or required," or "that can be dispensed
with," "superfluous," "nonessential." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 2293 (1976)
53. J. WIGMORE 1904, supra note 18, § 1918 at 2550. Nearly identical text appears in the
Chadbourn revision. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1918, at 11.
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Railway v. Kellogg54 concerned a dispute over a fire that had started
on a Mississippi River steamboat and had spread to a grain elevator
and a nearby sawmill." The owner of the sawmill claimed damages
from the owner of the steamboat and elevator. The steamboat/eleva-
tor owner attempted to call a fire insurance expert as a witness to
testify that the two buildings were located so far from each other that
the elevator would not have been considered a risk to the sawmill for
the purpose of setting fire insurance rates.56 The trial court refused to
admit the expert's testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding:
"The subject of the proposed inquiry was a matter of common obser-
vation, upon which the lay or uneducated mind is capable of forming
a judgment. In regard to such matters, experts are not permitted to
state their conclusions."57
In Spring Co. v. Edgar," a woman sued to recover damages for
injuries she had suffered when she was attacked by a wild buck in a
privately owned park that was open to the public.59 The case turned
on whether the park's owner should have known that bucks are dan-
gerous and therefore should have exercised greater care to prevent the
attack.6 ° The woman introduced as experts a dentist, who claimed to
be familiar with deer through personal observation and hunting, and a
taxidermist, who had studied natural history and had read the "stan-
dard authors" on deer.61 The trial court overruled defense objections
that the witnesses were not shown to be competent as experts.62
On appeal, the park owner argued that the testimony of the
expert witnesses was inadmissible for the following reasons: First, an
animal's character and disposition were facts to be ascertained
through experience; second, expert opinions were admissible only on
questions of science, skill, or trade; third, the books of natural history
that one witness had read were not of themselves competent evidence;
and fourth, the witness' statements based on books about living ani-
mals well known to many people amounted to hearsay.63 The Court
held that even if the witnesses were not qualified as experts, their testi-
mony was admissible because it dealt with a matter of "common
54. 94 U.S. 469 (1877).
55. Id. at 470.
56. Id. at 472.
57. Id. at 472-73.
58. 99 U.S. 645 (1878).
59. Id. at 646.
60. Id. at 653-56.
61. Id. at 647-48.
62. Id. at 648.
63. Id. at 650.
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knowledge.""6 The jurors, who presumably knew something of the
subject themselves, were instructed by the trial court that they were to
determine the proper weight to give to the testimony. Thus, the
Court held that it was not improper to allow an expert to testify as to
information the jurors were presumed to know.
In 1891, the Court once again adopted the more orthodox view
of "common knowledge." In Inland & Seaboard Coasting Co. v. Tol-
son, 65 a wharf owner sued the operator of a steamboat to recover dam-
ages for the injury he suffered when the boat struck the wharf with
great force, breaking several planks and crushing his foot.6 6 The
steamboat's owner raised contributory negligence as a defense and
produced an experienced riverboat captain to testify whether it was
reasonably safe for a wharfinger 67 to stand two or three feet from the
fender piles of a wharf constructed like the one in question while a
boat was approaching.68 The Court held that the issue was to be
decided by the jury, "depending on common knowledge and observa-
tion, and requiring no special training or experience to decide, and
upon which, therefore, no opinions of witnesses were admissible. '69
Today, the reasoning of all three of these decisions seems
strangely antiquated. Most modem Americans would undoubtedly
take it for granted that appropriate experts could provide a jury with
very useful information, going well beyond common experience, on
such matters as how close to each other a wooden sawmill and a
wooden grain elevator may be constructed without foreseeable risk
that a fire in one will spread to the other, whether bucks are likely to
attack humans, and how close to the edge of a wharf one may safely
stand while a boat is landing there.
This perception may simply reflect the fact that today's city
dweller is not as "close to nature" as the typical American of a cen-
tury ago, but that is probably not the entire answer. The questions in
all three cases involved somewhat esoteric circumstances falling
outside the range of everyday experience. It seems extraordinary to
suggest that a jury of lay persons could not have seen these matters
more clearly with the assistance of persons who had studied them in
64. Id. at 658.
65. 139 U.S. 551 (1891).
66. Id. at 552.
67. A "wharfinger" is "the operator or manager of a commercial wharf" or "one in charge
of the handling of freight at a wharf who assigns the workers and facilities needed for the
loading and unloading, storage, or removal of goods." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2600 (1976).
68. 139 U.S. at 559. The witness had never seen the actual site of the accident, and gave
his opinion based on his general expertise regarding wharves and safe landing procedures. Id.
69. Id. at 560.
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greater detail. Rather, the Court seemed to be saying that even if an
expert could assist jurors in their decision, these are matters that must
be determined on the basis of ordinary experience and common sense
alone, perhaps because of some nineteenth century instinct that these
are the kinds of things that each individual should know and decide
for himself.7" The modern view is quite different. Today, human
knowledge is vast and specialized. On any given factual matter, we
simply assume that there will be someone who has studied the subject
and can give a more informed opinion than the average lay person.
Thus, regardless of what most people share as common knowledge,
the truly commonplace-information that the average lay person can
be expected to know beyond all possibility of assistance from an
expert-probably has shrunken dramatically in the past century.
The Federal Rules of Evidence make no reference to a common
knowledge standard. Rule 702 requires only that expert witness testi-
mony be supported by "scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue."71 The advisory committee's
note defines this helpfulness standard as "the common sense inquiry
whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelli-
gently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without
enlightenment from those having specialized understanding of the
subject involved in the dispute."172
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. ,73 the
court, noting this language, stated that the rule "expands slightly the
practice of most jurisdictions of permitting expert testimony only
when the subject matter was otherwise beyond lay comprehension. 74
After examining a series of cases dealing with the admissibility of var-
ious types of expert testimony, most not involving matters of common
knowledge, the court concluded that "the expert must utilize special-
ized knowledge, not ordinarily possessed by the layman, to reach an
70. In this context, Spring, in which expert testimony was admitted, may be distinguished
from Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. and Inland and Seaboard Coasting, in which expert testimony
was excluded, only because the trial court in Spring instructed the jury that it was free to
disregard the expert testimony. It should also be noted that in all three cases, the Court
affirmed lower court rulings. See infra note 159 and the first paragraph of Section V.
71. FED. R. EVID. 702.
72. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (1973) (quoting
Ladd, supra note 23, at 418).
73. 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), incorporated by reference, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
74. Id. at 1330.
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opinion which truly aids the jury.""
Zenith was an antitrust action in which American manufacturers
claimed that Japanese manufacturers had formed a cartel to control
illegally the United States television receiver market and drive the
American manufacturers out of the business.7 6 The district court
opinion, one of many in a long, complicated case, dealt with the
admissibility of the testimony of several expert economists, intro-
duced by the American manufacturers to prove their conspiracy the-
ory." The court excluded major parts of all the proffered testimony
on two principal grounds. First, it ruled that the underlying facts and
analytical techniques employed by the economists did not justify rea-
sonable reliance by experts in the field.7" Second, it ruled that the
experts, in arriving at their conclusions, did not apply a level of eco-
nomic expertise beyond the understanding that the jurors themselves
might have applied in examining the same data. 9 In other words,
although the underlying economic data might have been highly spe-
cialized and beyond the knowledge of ordinary laymen, the ability to
analyze the facts and draw conclusions from them required only com-
mon knowledge or common reasoning ability. Therefore, expert testi-
mony was not needed.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
reversed,8 0 rejecting both the district court's dictum as to the exist-
ence of a remaining common knowledge rule"1 and its application of
the rule to the testimony at issue. 2 The Third Circuit pointed out
that "the requirement ... that expert testimony be 'beyond the jury's
sphere of knowledge' adopts a formulation which was rejected by the
drafters of Rule 702." The court added:
75. Id. at 1334.
76. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 251 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g in
part Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
incorporat'g by reference 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
77. 505 F. Supp. at 1319-20. The opinion discussed in great detail the contents of lengthy
reports that were prepared by the economists. The reports set forth the opinions to which the
economists were prepared to testify at trial. Id. at 1319.
78. Id. at 1339-41 passim. Analysis of the reasonable reliance issue entails an
interpretation of Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and is outside the scope of this
Comment.
79. Id. at 1342
80. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g in part
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
incorporat'g by reference 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
81. Id. at 279.
82. Id. at 280.
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Such a test is incompatible with the standard of helpfulness
expressed in Rule 702. First, it assumes wrongly that there is a
bright line separating issues within the comprehension of jurors
from those that are not. Secondly, even when jurors are well
equipped to make judgments on the basis of their common knowl-
edge and experience, experts may have specialized knowledge to
bring to bear on the same issue which would be helpful.8 3
The Third Circuit also held that the lower court was clearly errone-
ous in finding that the conclusions to be expressed in the testimony
would have been unhelpful to the jury in light of the "complexity of
the economic issues involved."84
Although the trial and appellate courts used the language of the
common law rule barring expert opinion testimony on matters of
common knowledge, they addressed matters that cannot reasonably
be considered within the common knowledge of the average lay per-
son. The district court could hardly have believed that most jurors
would be able to evaluate and draw conclusions from highly technical
and sophisticated economic data with the proficiency of trained econ-
omists. Although the district court's discredited ruling may have
been an attempt to exclude testimony on the ultimate issue, as sug-
gested in both opinions,"5 it also might have indicated a different
unarticulated concern: that there was no real truth to be derived from
the presented facts. The district court apparently was saying that no
conclusion regarding the existence of an illegal cartel could be derived
with substantial certainty from the evidence available to the expert
witnesses. Therefore, in the court's view, because the experts' claims
of certainty were not reliable, the opinions of the experts were no bet-
ter than those of the jurors.
Weinstein points out that "[tihe helpfulness test subsumes a rele-
vancy analysis," which includes evaluation of the current state of
knowledge on the subject of the proposed expert testimony as it
relates to the court's view of the facts of the case.86 In Zenith, as in
the two cases next considered, the courts appear to have been con-
cerned more with the limited state of available knowledge than with
the witness telling jurors what they already should know. The dis-
course has shifted from expert testimony being inadmissible because
the witness proposes to state a conclusion that anybody could reach,
83. Id. at 279 (quoting 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
702[02], at 702-10 (1982) (footnotes omitted)).
84. Id. at 280.
85. Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d at 279; Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1333-34; see
infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
86. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 702[02], at 702-11.
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to expert testimony being inadmissible because the witness proposes
to state a conclusion that even the witness cannot reach with any cer-
tainty. In the cases examined, however, the parties who raised this
argument did not convince the court that the expert testimony was
useless to the jury and should be excluded.
In United States v. Cyphers, 7 the defendants were on trial for
bank robbery.88 One of the evidentiary issues in the case involved the
trial court's admission of expert testimony regarding the microscopic
comparison of hair samples.8 9 The defendants objected to expert tes-
timony that hair found on objects used by the robbers were "micro-
scopically like" their own hair.9" The expert testified that it was
possible but not certain that the hair he tested came from the defend-
ants.9 1 The defendants argued that the expert's conclusions were so
speculative that they were irrelevant and prejudicial, and that they
were not based on reasonable scientific certainty.92 In affirming the
trial court's admission of the testimony, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the subject matter of
the testimony was "beyond the ken of the ordinary layman" and
therefore proper under Rule 702. 93 Only after disposing of this
implicit common knowledge issue did the court rule that the lack of
absolute certainty in the witness' statement of his conclusion goes to
the weight of his testimony but not its admissibility.94
The Supreme Court of the United States carried the logic of the
Cyphers court one step further. In Barefoot v. Estelle,95 the defendant
had been convicted of capital murder in Texas.96 The state's capital
87. 553 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977).
88. Id. at 1066.
89. Id. at 1067.
90. Id. at 1071.
91. Id. at 1072.
92. Id. The defendants also argued that the government did not prove that the hairs in
question had been located on the objects used by the robbers at the time the police discovered
the objects. Id. at 1073. The court held that the possibility the hairs might have fallen onto
the objects while they were in police custody went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the
expert's testimony. Id.
93. Id. at 1072.
94. Id. at 1072-73. Note that the court's analysis in Cyphers dealt with the fact that the
witness could not declare unequivocally that the hairs found at the scene of the crime came
from the defendants. Id. at 1071-72. At issue was the degree of certainty with which the
witness expressed his conclusion, not the scientific acceptance or validity of the technique the
expert used to arrive at his conclusion. The Cyphers court pointed out that the propriety of the
testing technique and the validity of the conclusions drawn by the expert are subject to cross-
examination, but apparently the defendant did not raise on appeal any objection to the
scientific validity of microscopic comparison of hair samples. Id. at 1072.
95. 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
96. Id. at 883.
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punishment statute required the court to ask the jury in a separate
sentencing hearing "whether there [was] a probability that the defend-
ant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society." 97 In the sentencing hearing, the state
qualified two psychiatrists as expert witnesses, described the defend-
ant's past conduct to them in the form of hypothetical questions, and
asked them to predict whether the defendant would commit future
acts of criminal violence.98 The witnesses opined that such a
probability existed, the jury answered the interrogatory in the affirma-
tive, and the defendant received the death sentence.99
On appeal, the defendant objected that the use of psychiatrists as
expert witnesses to predict future conduct was unconstitutional
because such testimony was demonstrably unreliable, and in fact, psy-
chiatrists could not predict "future dangerousness" with any reason-
able degree of accuracy."oo Writing for the Court, Justice White
responded that such a conclusion would be contrary to previous
cases.10' The Court had already ruled that the likelihood that a par-
ticular defendant would commit further violent crimes is a constitu-
97. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon 1981) (current version at
TEX. CODE CRIM, PRoc. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988)), quoted in Barefoot,
463 U.S. at 883-84.
98. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884, 918.
99. Id. at 884. After the defendant's conviction for capital murder, a separate sentencing
hearing was conducted before the same jury to obtain the answers to two prescribed questions,
as required by Texas law. Id. at 883 & n.1, 884 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071(b) (Vernon 1981) (current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1988))). The second of the two interrogatories is quoted above. The first was
"whether the conduct causing the death was 'committed deliberately and with reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result.' " Id. at 883 n.1, 884
(quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon 1981) (current version at
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988))). A third interrogatory
prescribed by the statute, if raised by the evidence, was not submitted to the jury in this case.
Id. at 883 n.1 (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(3) (Vernon 1981)
(current version at TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988))).
An affirmative answer to all questions presented, as in this case, resulted in the mandatory
imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 884; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(e)
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
100. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 884-85. The constitutional argument was that unreliable
predictions will lead to erroneous sentences, violating the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
Id. The American Psychiatric Association filed an amicus curiae brief in which it, too, argued
that psychiatric predictions of future behavior are too unreliable to be admitted in testimony
for this purpose. Id. at 899, 920. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that psychiatric
predictions of future dangerousness are wrong in two cases out of three, an assertion that
carries the ironic implication that Texas courts might produce a more just result if they
imposed the death sentence only if psychiatric witnesses predicted that the defendant would
not be dangerous in the future. Id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 896-98 (citing Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 (1981); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976); O'Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975)).
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tionally permissible criterion upon which to base a death sentence"°2
and that it is not impossible to predict future dangerous behavior:'0 3
[I]f it is not impossible for even a lay person sensibly to arrive at
[the] conclusion [that the defendant poses a danger of committing
future violent crimes], it makes little sense, if any, to submit that
psychiatrists, out of the entire universe of persons who might have
an opinion on the issue, would know so little about the subject that
they should not be permitted to testify."o,
Justice White's attempt to justify the admissibility of expert wit-
ness testimony by equating it with a determination by a jury of lay
persons was much the same as comparing apples and oranges. Lay
jurors necessarily must assess the defendant's future behavior.
Although nobody claims that jurors are infallible predictors of the
future, the Texas Legislature has given them the responsibility of
deciding whether a convicted capital murderer poses a continuing
threat to society.' On the other hand, witnesses, both lay and
expert, have no such statutory mandate. They may present their
opinions to the jury only if such testimony meets the requirements in
that jurisdiction for admission into evidence. Justice White was writ-
ing about the requirements of the federal Constitution,106 not the rules
of evidence for Texas state courts. 107 His reasoning, however,
answered a question that might have arisen in a court applying Rule
702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence: Whether psychiatric predic-
tions of future behavior can assist a jury in assessing a convicted capi-
tal murderer's "future dangerousness." In this context, the essence of
the Court's opinion was that this type of expert testimony should be
permitted regardless of its uncertain accuracy. The Court hammered
this point home by stating that, generally, unprivileged evidence
should be admitted, its weight left to the finder of fact to determine,
and the jury should also be able to consider the views of opposing
psychiatrists. 10 8
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that, given the known
102. Id. at 896 (citing Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76).
103. Id. (citing Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274-76).
104. Id. at 896-97.
105. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
106. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
107. The case was tried in a Texas state court, so the Federal Rules of Evidence did not
apply. At the time, Texas followed common law rules of evidence, except if preempted by
specific statutory provision. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.01 (Vernon 1979). There
was neither a general statute governing the subject matter of expert witness testimony nor a
specific statute relating to expert witness testimony in capital murder sentencing hearings. In
1985, Texas adopted new Rules of Criminal Evidence that contain a rule identical to Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 702 (West 1987).
108. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 898-99.
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unreliability of psychiatric predictions," 9 the issue of defendant's
future behavior in the context of a capital murder sentence hearing
does not lend itself to "the traditional battle of experts." 110 Jurors,
said Justice Blackmun, will now be called upon to determine the relia-
bility of psychiatric predictions, not the future dangerousness of the
individual defendant."' To prevent this unjust result, he argued,
expert psychiatric testimony should be excluded." 12
Thus the battle line has been drawn for possible debate in the
area of common knowledge. At what point do we declare that we will
not allow experts to testify because they too have only common
knowledge, at least to the extent that they can arrive at scientifically
defensible conclusions?
B. Exclusion Based on "Ultimate Issue of Fact" Testimony
1. THEORY OF THE RULE AND OBJECTIONS TO IT
The former rule against admission of testimony that contained an
opinion on an issue of ultimate fact was based on the notion that this
testimony simply told the jury what decision to make on contested
issues without giving jurors any meaningful assistance in deciding the
issue for themselves. In effect, objectors claimed, the witness made
the decision for the jury, or as is often stated, usurped the function of
the jury. Although there is a core of intuitively sound principle in this
rule, its application has been fraught with definitional and conceptual
problems. 113
To exclude ultimate issue testimony, the judge first had to deter-
mine that the proffered testimony was opinion, not fact." 4 Next, the
judge had to decide that the opinion was on a matter of ultimate,
rather than evidentiary, fact. Depending on the complexity of the
case, the number of elements to be proved, and the number of factual
questions that were contested, a case might have one or many ulti-
mate facts. Moreover, a fact that was evidentiary in one case might be
109. Id. at 916-29.
110. Id. at 934-35.
111. Id. at 935.
112. Id. at 938.
113. This discussion of objections to the Rule borrows its structure from J. WEINSTEIN,
supra note 10, 704[01], at 704-6 to -7.
114. This determination presents a knotty theoretical problem. Analytically, "fact" and
"opinion" tend to be relative terms, and a statement that is a fact in one context may be an
opinion in another. See J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1919, at 14-17; see also Note,
Opinion Testimony and Ultimate Issues: Incompatible?, 51 Ky. L.J. 540, 542-43 (1963). In
practice, whether disputed testimony is fact or opinion is not the issue in ultimate issue cases.
The parties start with the common premise that the contested testimony is opinion.
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ultimate in another.'15
Having crossed the definitional chasm, the judge might discover
that there was no better way for the witness to give his testimony than
by stating an opinion of ultimate fact:
If a witness in an automobile accident case said the car was speed-
ing, objections could be raised both on the basis of the opinion rule
and the ultimate fact rule. As in the case of the opinion rule, expe-
diency led to exceptions. Courts often allowed the witness to
express his opinion on issues like speed, value, or identity where
the witness would not otherwise have been able to give any testi-
mony of value to the jury., l6
Finally, and at the heart of the matter, underlying the ultimate
issue rule was an assumption that jurors would abdicate their fact-
finding role to the witness. Judges apparently felt that if the subject
matter was sufficiently "beyond the ken" of the average layman that
expert testimony was needed to help jurors understand the facts, then
jurors could easily be led to whatever ultimate conclusion was desired
by the proponent of the expert testimony. But this assumption
ignored two important mitigating factors: First, the balancing effect
of the adversary system, which gave the opposing party the opportu-
nity to cross-examine the expert and to introduce experts with oppos-
115. In a personal injury case resulting from an automobile accident, for example, an expert
witness stating that a reasonably competent driver should have been able to stop his car within
200 feet after rounding a curve and seeing a pedestrian in the roadway might be stating an
opinion on an ultimate fact if the only factual issue regarding negligence was whether the
driver stopped within a reasonable time after making the turn. If, however, there were other
issues-whether the pedestrian was hidden behind an obstruction until emerging suddenly into
the road, whether the pedestrian was dressed in dark clothes on a dark night and impossible to
see, or whether the car's brakes failed suddenly for reasons not the fault of the driver-the
expert's opinion might be one of only evidentiary fact, because all of these factors would
contribute to a determination of the driver's negligence.
Cases have defined ultimate facts very broadly and very narrowly. One definition is "facts
essential to the right of action or matter of defense." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (5th
ed. 1979) (citing Wichita Falls & Okla. Ry. v. Pepper, 134 Tex. 360, 371, 135 S.W.2d 79, 84
(1940), overruled on other grounds, Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981)). Under this broad definition, any fact necessary in the chain of proof, no matter
how remote from the ultimate conclusion, would be an ultimate fact. Another definition is
"[t]hose facts found in that vaguely defined field lying between evidential facts on the one side
and the primary issue or conclusion of law on the other, being but the logical results of the
proofs, or, in other words, mere conclusions of fact." Id. at 1365 (citing Christmas v. Cowden,
44 N.M. 517, 523, 105 P.2d 484, 487 (1940)). Although somewhat circular, this definition may
express a more common understanding of what the ultimate issue rule is trying to address.
For further discussion of the difficulties in trying to define issues of ultimate fact, see
Note, supra note 114, at 541-42.
116. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 704[01], at 704-6 (footnote omitted). Although
Weinstein's example usually applies to a lay witness, an expert might experience the same
problem. If a physician testifies as to the extent and permanency of an accident victim's
injuries, he is probably stating an opinion on an ultimate fact going to the issue of damages.
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ing opinions; and second, the traditional instruction to jurors
informing them that they were free to give as little or as much weight
to expert testimony as they chose and were obligated to evaluate all
the evidence independently and reach their own conclusions.117
Administration of the rule became even more complicated when
courts tried to separate pure issues of ultimate fact from issues involv-
ing legal terms of art or pure issues of law. To the extent that fact and
law are separable, the following discussion focuses first on pure fact
questions and then turns to questions of law.
2. HISTORY OF THE RULE
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,
the ultimate issue rule was the subject of much writing, most of it
urging abolishment; however, the rule never was adopted universally.
Scholars have not determined authoritatively the origin of the rule,
although it apparently is an American invention. 18 Wigmore
thought that it probably arose from an 1821 English case in which a
physician stated before a panel of judges, "My firm conviction is that
it was an act of insanity."119 After consulting on the case, "several of
the judges doubted whether the witness could be asked his opinion on
the very point which the jury were to decide." 121 Professor William
Stoebuck researched early American cases applying the rule and
found none that cited the English case.' 2' He stated that the rule
probably originated in an 1840 Vermont case, and subsequently was
recognized by courts in Louisiana, New York, and Iowa, all of them
citing no authority and "stat[ing] the rule casually in a matter-of-fact
way, as though it were too settled to require demonstration."'122
Professor Simon Greenleaf said in his 1842 treatise that "where
117. See J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 704[01], at 704-6 to -7; Slough, Testamentary
Capacity: Evidentiary Aspects, 36 TEx. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1957); Note, Expert Testimony as an
"Invasion of the Province of the Jury," 26 IOWA L. REV. 819, 840 (1941) [hereinafter Note,
Expert Testimony]; Note, Opinion Testimony "Invading the Province of the Jury," 20 U. CIN.
L. REV. 484, 488-89 (1951) [hereinafter Note, Opinion Testimony].
118. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 704[01], at 704-6.
119. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1921, at 21 n.1 (quoting Rex v. Wright, Russ. &
Ry. 456, 457-58, 168 Eng. Rep. 895, 896 (Cr. Cas. 1821)). Wigmore pointed out that
interpreting this case in the context of ultimate fact was probably erroneous because the
witness gave an opinion on a matter of law. Id.
120. Id. at 22 n.1.
121. Stoebuck, Opinions on Ultimate Facts: Status, Trends, and a Note of Caution, 41 DEN.
L. CENT. J. 226, 227 (1964).
122. Id. at 226-27. Professor Stoebuck cited the following cases: Muldowney v. Illinois
Cent. R., 39 Iowa 615, 622 (1874); Marcy v. Sun MutIns. Co., 11 La. Ann. 748, 749 (1856);
and Persse & Brooks Paper Works v. Willett, 24 N.Y. Super. Ct. 131, 154 (1863); Davis v.
Fuller, 12 Vt. 178, 189 (1840).
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scientific men are called as witnesses, they cannot give their opinions,
as to the general merits of the cause, but only their opinions upon the
facts proved."12 3 In debunking the rule in his 1904 treatise, Wigmore
called it "one of those impossible and misconceived utterances which
lack any justification in principle." '124 He cited four cases, from three
states, in which courts excluded ultimate issue testimony. 12 *He also
cited eight cases, from seven states, and three cases, from United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal, in which courts declined to follow
the rule.12
6
On the other hand, the 1938 edition of Professor Burr Jones' evi-
dence treatise declared:
If a question is so framed as to call upon the expert to deter-
mine the side on which the evidence preponderates or to reconcile
conflicting statements, he is in effect asked to decide the merits of
the case, a function which is wholly beyond his province.... [He]
must not usurp the province of the court and jury by drawing con-
clusions of law or fact upon which the decision of the case
depends. 127
A 1941 student note cited Jones for the proposition that the prohibi-
tion of ultimate issue testimony was well-settled law in a majority of
jurisdictions. 128
In 1935, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its opin-
ion in United States v. Spaulding,129 a case often cited as supporting
123. 1 S. GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 440, at 489 (1842 &
photo. reprint 1972). These words could be interpreted as a statement of the classic rule
against ultimate issue testimony, or in the still accepted narrower construction that an expert
witness should not be permitted to tell the jury what to decide.
124. J. WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1921, at 22.
125. J. WIGMORE 1904, supra note 18, § 1921, at 2556 & n.l. The three states were
Alabama, Illinois, and Indiana. Id. The Chadbourn revision cites the same cases, but the
footnote in that edition also includes numerous citations to more recent cases on point. J.
WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1921, at 21 n.l, 22.
126. Id. at 2557 & n.2. The seven states were Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New York, and Texas. Id. The Chadbourn revision cites the same cases, but
the footnote in that edition also includes numerous citations to more recent cases on point. J.
WIGMORE 1978, supra note 18, § 1921, at 22 n.2, 26.
127. 2 B. JONES, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES, § 372, at 698-99 (4th ed. 1938).
This statement, like the Greenleaf statement, can be read broadly or narrowly. Taken at face
value, Jones also may be saying only that the expert should not tell the jury how to vote.
128. Note, Expert Testimony, supra note 117, at 825 (citing 3 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL CASES §§ 1313, 1321 (J. Henderson 2d ed. 1926)). The
note urged total abolition of the ultimate issue rule in Iowa. A number of other commentators
also advocated an end to the rule. See, e.g., Ladd, supra note 23, at 424-25; Note, supra note
114, at 548; Note, Opinion Testimony, supra note 117, at 493-94. But see Austin, Some Rules
Governing the Examination of Expert Witnesses in Illinois, 19 ILL. L. REV. 57, 70 (1924).
129. 293 U.S. 498 (1935).
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the ultimate issue rule. 30 Plaintiff Spaulding sued to collect disability
benefits under a war-risk policy that had lapsed more than eight years
earlier. 3 ' The government denied liability, asserting that Spaulding
had not suffered "total permanent disability" while the policy was in
force, as required by statute and the policy. 32 Three doctors called
by the plaintiff as expert witnesses testified that Spaulding could not
work without damaging his health and shortening his life. ' 33 One said
that he was "totally and permanently disabled."'' 34  In an opinion
written by Justice Butler, the Court found that the testimony was
inadmissible because "[t]he experts ought not to have been asked or
allowed to state their conclusions on the whole case."' 135
130. See, e.g., Dean v. Flemming, 180 F. Supp. 553, 556 (E.D. Ky. 1959); M. GRAHAM,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 704.1, at 639-40 & n.99 (1981); MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 12, at 30 & n.3 (E. Cleary ed. 1984); J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 704[01], at
704-9 & n.18; Slough, supra note 117, at 12 & n.47. But see Stoebuck, supra note 121, at 229
n.24. Most of the federal courts that have cited Spaulding have used it to support a more
narrow holding than the ultimate issue rule. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York v.
Frost, 164 F.2d 542, 548 (1 st Cir. 1947) (Expert opinion is objectionable if it "entangles factual
matters as to which an expert opinion is appropriate with questions of law."); Tiller v.
Celebrezze, 211 F. Supp. 792, 795 (S.D. W. Va. 1962) ("A flat assertion by a doctor that the
claimant was disabled or unable to perform any gainful activity is of little, if any, assistance in
aiding the arbiter of the facts in arriving at his conclusion concerning the disability as
contemplated by the Act.").
131. Spaulding, 293 U.S. at 499-500.
132. Id. at 500.
133. Id. at 503-04.
134. Id. at 504.
135. Id. at 506. Actually, Justice Butler's adoption of the ultimate issue rule was less than
unequivocal. He wrote:
Clearly the experts failed to give proper weight to [Spaulding's] fitness for naval
air service or to the work he performed, and misinterpreted "total permanent
disability" as used in the policy and statute authorizing the insurance. Moreover,
that question is not to be resolved by opinion evidence. It was the ultimate issue
to be decided by the jury upon all the evidence in obedience to the judge's
instructions as to the meaning of the crucial phrase and other questions of law.
Id.
Although he used the catchwords "ultimate issue," Justice Butler may have been more
concerned with the doctors' apparent misuse of the statutory and contractual definition of
"total permanent disability" than with their reaching a factual conclusion about Spaulding's
inability to work. Spaulding may actually be an early contribution to the current search for a
clear understanding of how far an expert may go in describing his factual conclusion in legal
terms. See infra Section III(C). The Court's intention is also somewhat muddied by the fact
that it disagreed with the factual conclusion reached by the doctors.
Another noteworthy aspect of Spaulding is the Court's use of authority in support of the
ultimate issue rule. Neither of the two Supreme Court cases cited deals with ultimate issue
testimony at all. Schmieder v. Barney, 113 U.S. 645, 648 (1884); Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. v
Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 472 (1877). Kellogg, however, does contain an elaborately documented
exposition of the common knowledge rule. 94 U.S. at 472. The three court of appeals cases
cited do state the rule against ultimate issue testimony. Germantown Trust Co. v. Lederer,
263 F. 672, 676 (3d Cir. 1920); Mullins Lumber Co. v. Williamson & Brown Land & Lumber
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Just eight years after Spaulding, the Court rejected the logic of
the ultimate issue rule but did not mention the words "ultimate
issue," or cite to Spaulding or any other case. 13 6 The occasion was the
Court's opinion in United States v. Johnson,137 a case in which the
defendants had been convicted of income tax evasion and related
charges in connection with the operation of several illegal gambling
parlors. 138 The district court admitted the testimony of an expert wit-
ness regarding defendant Johnson's income and expenditures, includ-
ing "computations based on substantially the entire evidence in the
record as to Johnson's income."' 39 The United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the testimony improper
because the witness was testifying on the "controverted issue" of the
case."4 The Supreme Court reversed, finding the testimony alto-
gether proper. 14  Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter pointed
out that the testimony did not remove or withdraw any issue from the'
jury or interfere with the jury's ability to examine the same evidence
evaluated by the expert and draw its own conclusion indepen-
dently. 142 In fact, Justice Frankfurter wrote, any suggestion that the
jury could not properly fulfill its role as the ultimate arbiter of fact,
"tacitly assum[ed] that juries are too stupid to see the drift of evi-
dence." ' 4  Justice Frankfurter added:
The jury in this case could not possibly have been misled into the
notion that they must accept the calculations of the government
expert any more than that they were bound by the calculations
made by the defense's expert based on the defendants' assumptions
of the case." 4
Co., 255 F. 645, 646 (4th Cir. 1918); Fireman's Ins. Co. of Baltimore v. J. H. Mohiman Co., 91
F. 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1898).
136. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 519-20 (1943). Spaulding was reported as a
unanimous decision. 293 U.S. at 507. Although only a short time elapsed between Spaulding
and Johnson, the composition of the Court had changed dramatically by the time Johnson was
decided. Only Justices Stone and Roberts were members of the Court during the consideration
of both cases. In Johnson, Justice Roberts dissented as to the evidentiary ruling. 319 U.S. at
520. His one paragraph opinion stated that substantial trial errors in the admission of evidence
had operated to the prejudice of the defendant. Id. Justices Murphy, Jackson, and Rutledge
did not participate in the case. Id.
137. 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
138. Id. at 515-17.
139. Id. at 519.
140. United States v. Johnson, 123 F.2d 111, 128 (7th Cir. 1941), rev'd, 319 U.S. 503
(1943).
141. Johnson, 319 U.S. at 519.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. The Supreme Court had earlier declined to exclude testimony on ultimate fact
questions in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Watson, 190 U.S. 287 (1903), and Transportation Line
v. Hope, 95 U.S. 297 (1877).
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Because Johnson did not explicitly overrule Spaulding, attorneys liti-
gating in federal courts before the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence could find precedent both for and against the ultimate issue
rule. 145
Meanwhile, the rule was also losing ground in the state courts.
According to Dean Ladd and Professor Stoebuck, a 1942 Iowa case,
Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co.,1 46 was the seminal case in
145. Spaulding and Johnson illustrate the flexibility of the "ultimate issue" concept if used
as an argument to exclude expert testimony. In Spaulding, the jury was asked to decide
whether Spaulding was entitled to receive payment for his insurance claim. 293 U.S. at 499-
500. One essential element of that entitlement was the determination that Spaulding had been
totally and permanently disabled while the policy was in force, a question for the jury to decide
by matching the medical evidence presented against the legal criteria for total permanent
disability. Id. at 506. The Supreme Court decision does not state explicitly whether there were
other essential elements of the claim in issue at trial, but it implies that there were not. Id.
The medical evidence at issue in the Supreme Court decision consisted of medical conclusions
that Spaulding could not work without serious detriment to his health and that his condition
would not improve. Id. at 503-04. These conclusions were based on more preliminary medical
conclusions that Spaulding was suffering from kidney failure and related conditions, which
were based, in turn, on the diagnostic tools used by physicians, e.g., medical history, patient's
stated symptoms, direct observations, and test results. Id. at 502-04. The testimony that the
Supreme Court declared improper was thus at the third level in a five-level hierarchy of proof,
starting with Spaulding's symptoms and ending with the conclusion that he was entitled to
payment. The important point, however, is that if no other elements of the claim were at issue
in the trial, then as a practical matter, the physicians' testimony answered the question at the
very heart of the issue the jury was to decide. If the opinions of the physicians were taken at
face value, there were no other points of controversy along the path to the conclusion that
Spaulding was entitled to payment. Id. at 506.
In Johnson, the ultimate jury question was whether Johnson and his codefendants had
violated the statute that prohibited willful attempts to evade payment of income taxes. 319
U.S. at 505-06. One essential element of this determination was the conclusion that Johnson's
correct tax liability was larger than the amount he claimed on his return, a question for the
jury to answer by determining the amount of Johnson's income and his tax liability according
to statutory criteria. Id. at 514-17. In this case, the government claimed and Johnson denied
that Johnson was the owner of several gambling parlors and that income from these enterprises
was attributable to Johnson. Id. at 516-17. There were no accurate business records to show
the earnings of the gambling parlors, so the government attempted to estimate the amount by
circumstantial evidence that showed that Johnson's personal expenses were much greater than
his declared income. Id. at 516-18. The jury was asked to make a leap from circumstantial
evidentiary facts to a factual conclusion regarding the nature and extent of Johnson's
relationship with the gambling parlors. The expert testimony that Johnson sought to exclude
was an attempt by the government to help the jury make this leap by showing how all the
evidence of Johnson's income and expenses could be assembled and what computations could
be made upon it to determine Johnson's taxable income. Id. at 519. Thus, the testimony
challenged as being inadmissible because it was "on the 'controverted issue' in the case," id.,
was actually bridging the gap between primary evidentiary facts and a factual conclusion that
the jury had to reach before it could apply legal criteria to determine one element of its final
determination. Again, this is a long way in the hierarchy of proof from the final jury issue of
the case. The defense argument assumed that if this particular testimony were to be accepted
by the jury, then Johnson would be found guilty because there was nothing seriously
controverted farther up the chain of proof.
146. 232 Iowa 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942).
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reversing the common law trend. 47 In Grismore, a farmer sued a feed
salesman for selling him a product that allegedly killed his turkeys. 148
An expert in turkey-raising was permitted to testify as to the cause of
the death of the turkeys, the sole issue in the case. 49 The Supreme
Court of Iowa affirmed the admission in a lengthy opinion that Dean
Ladd described as "so ably written that it ought to have awakened
other courts to the possibility of making a clean sweep on this dis-
turbing problem."' 150 Apparently, that is exactly what happened,
although like most changes in the law it did not occur quickly or
neatly. By 1964, Professor Stoebuck was able to report that since
Grismore, thirty-four states, eight federal circuits, and the District of
Columbia had joined Iowa in abandoning or relaxing the rule.''
Thus, the adoption of Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
abolishing the ultimate issue rule, did little more than codify the then
existing practice in federal and state courts. 5 2
3. FEDERAL CASES UNDER RULE 704
Rule 704(a), which deals with opinion on ultimate issues, states
in part: [T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact."' 53
Although Rule 704(a) abolishes the common law ultimate issue
rule for the federal courts, except for the narrow proscription con-
tained in Rule 704(b),15 4 it only ends the exclusion of testimony on the
basis of an ultimate issue objection. It does not admit testimony sim-
ply because the testimony touches on an ultimate issue. The advisory
committee's note to Rule 704 states:
Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier of
fact, and Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes
time. These provisions afford ample assurances against the admis-
sion of opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to
147. Ladd, supra note 23, at 423-24; Stoebuck, supra note 121, at 228 n.18.
148. 232 Iowa at 330-31, 5 N.W.2d at 649.
149. 232 Iowa at 340-41, 5 N.W.2d at 653-54.
150. Ladd, supra note 23, at 424.
151. Stoebuck, supra note 121, at 228-36. Additionally, Stoebuck reported, New
Hampshire appeared never to have adopted the rule at all. Id. at 228.
152. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 704[01], at 704-8 (citing PROJECT OF A COMMITTEE
OF NEW YORK TRIAL LAWYERS, RECOMMENDATION AND STUDY RELATING TO THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE 205, 206, 207 (June 1, 1970)).
153. FED. R. EVID. 704(a). Subdivision (b) excludes expert testimony as to whether or not
a criminal defendant had the mental state or condition constituting an element of a crime or
defense. FED. R. EVID. 704(b); see infra Section III(D).
154. See supra note 153.
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reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier
day.155
Further, the rule refers only to "an ultimate issue to be decided
by the trier of fact," not to an ultimate issue of fact.1 56 Thus, by its
text alone, the rule does not exclude expert opinions phrased in legal
terminology. In a negligence case, for example, the jury might be
asked to determine whether the defendant's conduct was negligent
after the judge instructed the jury as to the legal meaning of the word
"negligence" and the elements of which it is composed. Should an
expert witness be permitted to testify in the same case that, in his
opinion, the defendant was negligent? The extent to which an expert
witness is permitted to express an opinion using the words of the law
is a matter of considerable uncertainty.1 57
The immediate analysis, however, is concerned only with opin-
ions of ultimate fact and attempts to determine whether the courts are
excluding evidence on the basis of a perceived ultimate issue rule
despite Rule 704, and whether the courts are evading the intention of
Rule 704--excluding ultimate issue testimony by arbitrarily declaring
that it does not assist the jury, under the Rule 702 standard.
As noted by Judge Weinstein, few cases are settled by reference
to Rule 704.158 Cases involving issues of ultimate fact alone, without
reference to legal questions, are few indeed. Most instructive is a
group of cases in which the trial courts excluded evidence on grounds
sounding in the ultimate issue theory, only to be overturned on
appeal. 159
In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 6
the district court noted the plaintiffs' claim that the proffered expert
witness testimony on the economics of the consumer electronics
industry would provide "specialized knowledge [that would] indeed
help the fact finder to interpret the evidence before it." '' The defend-
155. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1973).
156. Weinstein says that "the result is the same with or without these words." J.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 704[01], at 704-8 n.16.
157. See infra Section Ill(C).
158. J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, 704[02], at 704-13.
159. Reversals are much more revealing than aflirmances in opinion testimony cases
because appellate courts give trial judges wide-ranging discretion in this area, reversing only if
they find clear abuse of that discretion. Thus, an affirmance usually stands only for the
proposition that the trial judge acted within his discretion, not that the appellate court would
have made the same ruling. Pratt, supra note 11, at 313, 327 & cases cited at 313 n.1.
160. 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), incorporated by reference, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
161. Id. at 1331.
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ants countered that the experts' opinions "ha[d] gone beyond the
types of testimony contemplated by [Rule 704] and ha[d] entered the
province of 'oath-helping' by merely interpreting the evidence ....
explaining, in effect, what result should be reached." '162 In response to
these conflicting perspectives, the court fashioned its own theory of
the ultimate issue rule:
If, as defendants contend, the expert opinions in this litigation stem
merely from a rehash of the evidence already before the trier of
fact, without adding a component of expertise, i.e., without
instructing the trier of fact "in the ways of his [the expert's] work,"
those portions will be found inadmissible because they are the
unhelpful "oath-helping" of a "conspiracyologist." If, on the other
hand, the experts' economic sophistication enables them to explain
the evidence to the jury in a permissible manner otherwise beyond
the jury's sphere of knowledge, the opinion would be admissible.
We note that expert testimony may not be used merely to interpret
a factually complex record. The test for admissibility of an
expert's opinion turns not on complexity but on the subject matter
of the opinion, i.e., on whether the expert's specialized knowledge
enhances the jury's understanding.1 63
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit dismissed
the district court's exegesis with one terse comment: "[T]o the extent
that the trial court's discussion suggests that expressions of opinion
on the ultimate fact in issue somehow impermissibly invade the prov-
ince of the jury, it is inconsistent with the clear mandate of Rule
704.,164
In Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,165 the dis-
trict court was reversed on its exclusion of three different items of
expert testimony, one bearing on an ultimate issue of fact. 6 6
Vucinich, an individual of limited means and no sophistication
regarding investments, sold $40,000 worth of stock she had inherited
and invested the proceeds by selling short, upon the advice of the
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1334. The trial court determined that large parts of the expert opinions in this
case did not meet this articulation of the helpfulness standard and were merely conclusions
drawn from proffered testimony. This holding was one basis for the court's exclusion of the
expert witness testimony. Id. at 1342.
164. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 279 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'g in
part Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
incorporat'g by reference 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds sub
nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The Third
Circuit ruled that the excluded testimony was admissible. Id. at 282; see supra notes 80-84 and
accompanying text.
165. 803 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1986).
166. Id. at 461.
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defendant, a broker. 67 Although Vucinich had told the broker that
she was interested in capital gains but not in gambling or speculation,
the broker did not warn her that selling short was an extremely specu-
lative and high risk form of investment.1 6 After following his advice
through several transactions, Vucinich lost all but $8,274 of her
investment over a four-year period. She then filed suit, claiming viola-
tions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,169 common law fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence.' 71
The trial court excluded testimony by the plaintiff's securities
business expert on the suitability of the investments offered to
Vucinich, the adequacy of the information given to her by the broker,
and the degree of control the broker exercised over her account,
according to industry standards.' 7' The exclusion was reversed on
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit find-
ing that all of the testimony would have "assisted the trier of fact 'to
understand the evidence.' "172
Expert testimony on financial matters was also the subject of
reversal in United States v. Lueben.173 Lueben, a packager of real
estate investment deals, was accused of making materially false state-
ments to a federally insured savings and loan association in order to
secure a loan.174 Lueben based his defense on the argument that the
misstatements were not material, as required by the statutory defini-
tion of the offense. 17' He proffered as an expert a certified financial
examiner, who was prevented from testifying that a savings and loan
would look only to the value of the property in making a loan of the
type in question and would disregard the items that were misstated on
the application. 76
In excluding the evidence, the trial court stated the remarkable
conclusion that "under Federal Rule of Evidence 704, a party 'cannot
offer an expert opinion on one of the ultimate issues of fact, one of the
ultimate issues in the case,' " citing two recent Fifth Circuit cases for
support.' 77 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
responded that the trial court had misconstrued the meaning of the
167. Id. at 456-57.
168. Id. at 457.
169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78t(a) (1982).
170. Vucinich, 803 F.2d at 456.
171. Id. at 461.
172. Id.
173. 812 F.2d 179, vacated in part on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987).
174. Id. at 181-82.
175. Id. at 183 & n.3.
176. Id. at 182-83.
177. Id. at 183. The cases cited were Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 770 F.2d 1303
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cited cases, both of which dealt with testimony on disputed conclu-
sions of law.' 7 ' In this case, the witness was not testifying that
Lueben's misstatements were immaterial, a legal conclusion, only that
the savings and loan would have tended to disregard them, a factual
conclusion. 179
Taken together, In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Liti-
gation,8 0 Vucinich,' 8 1 and Lueben 182 suggest an answer to both the
inquiries posed at the beginning of this subsection: If the court con-
cludes that challenged testimony involves only an issue of fact, it is
likely to admit the testimony into evidence regardless of whether the
opinion stated addresses an ultimate issue, and it will tend to construe
narrowly any other available ground for excluding ultimate issue tes-
timony, such as the Rule 702 requirement that the opinion assist the
trier of fact.18 3
(5th Cir. 1985), and Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983); see infra notes
280-93 & 368-72 and accompanying text.
178. Lueben, 812 F.2d at 183-84.
179. Id. at 184. One is tempted to argue, of course, that the proffered testimony would have
entirely disposed of the legal issue, materiality, as well, because the misstatements clearly
would be immaterial if the savings and loan ignored them. The case illustrates the fine line
courts draw in distinguishing between issues of fact and issues of law. It also demonstrates the
court's inclination to find a ground to admit the testimony in a situation in which the court
easily could have decided the other way.
180. 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), incorporated by reference, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
181. 803 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
182. 812 F.2d 179, vacated in part on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987); see
supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
183. FED. R. EvID. 702. In other cases, courts of appeals have upheld district court rulings
allowing expert testimony going to an ultimate issue of fact. For instance, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court's admission of expert testimony
that clothing seized from a defendant matched clothing worn by a robber in surveillance
photographs. Identification of the robber was the ultimate issue in contention. United States
v. Barrett, 703 F.2d 1076, 1084 n.14 (9th Cir. 1983). It was error to admit the expert's
conclusion that the items of clothing matched, but only because the government had
voluntarily agreed that the expert would not offer a conclusion. Id. Had there been no such
agreement, the testimony would have been entirely proper. Id. The court found that the error
was rendered harmless by a curative instruction to the jury. Id.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the admission of testimony that a particular feature of a boat
trailer taillight would be obvious to any person knowledgeable in the field, in a case in which
such obviousness made the feature ineligible for patent protection. Moore v. Wesbar Corp.,
701 F.2d 1247, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1983).
And the Sixth Circuit upheld the admission of testimony that an employee was
terminated from his job because of his age in an age discrimination suit. Davis v. Combustion
Eng'g, Inc., 742 F.2d 916, 919 (6th Cir. 1984). The court suggested, however, that the expert
should not have been permitted to testify that the employee's termination was "'unlawful' age
discrimination," because that was a conclusion of law, not fact. Id. at 919-20; see infra notes
294-300 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, expert testimony that reaches the ultimate issue of
fact will not necessarily be excluded merely because it is cumulative in
nature and serves principally to tie together a large volume of com-
plex evidence. In United States v. Schafer, 184 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the government may call an
expert witness in a complex tax case "[i]n order to assist the jury in
organizing and understanding the mass of testimony and documents
before them ... provided ... that the expert testifies on the basis of
facts in evidence."' 15 One district court case demonstrates, however,
that there may be limits to the admissibility of cumulative expert testi-
mony on an ultimate issue. In King v. Fox Grocery Co.,186 an
employee discharged from his job filed suit alleging violation of the
Labor-Management Relations Act."87 He attempted to introduce an
expert report on the employee's termination prepared by a labor law-
yer.8 8 After noting that Rule 704 abolishes objections to expert testi-
mony on ultimate issues of fact, the trial court ruled that the report
was not admissible:18 9
Review of the report shows that it does not simply embrace an
ultimate issue; it consists almost entirely of the proposed expert's
opinion on the ultimate issue. The report is a far cry from the typi-
cal form of expert's report which largely concerns itself with com-
plex or disputed facts. The trier of fact does not need an expert to
determine the facts of this labor case. All that need be done is to
unravel the chronology of conduct among the parties during the
period in question.' 90
It may be concluded from the foregoing discussion that the fed-
eral courts appear to be applying Rule 704(a) vigorously and liberally
on cases involving expert testimony on issues of ultimate fact. An
opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
demonstrates, however, that in at least some cases, the courts may not
be happy with the outcome of the rule. In United States v. Brown,' 9'
184. 580 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978).
185. Id. at 778. The court cited United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943), in support
of this proposition and did not refer at all to the Federal Rules of Evidence. For a discussion
of Johnson, see supra notes 136-45 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the Schafer ruling
clearly allows testimony that is solely an opinion on the ultimate issue of fact. "Indeed,
without [the expert's] testimony, the jury might well have been hopelessly confused, for it
would have been well-nigh impossible for them to determine whether Schafer in fact had
substantially underpaid his taxes." Schafer, 580 F.2d at 778.
186. 642 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Pa. 1986).
187. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). King, 642 F. Supp. at 289.
188. Id. at 291.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 776 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986).
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an undercover police officer was allowed to testify, on the basis of his
personal knowledge of the alleged crime and his experience in investi-
gating narcotics traffic, that the defendant had acted in a drug deal as
a "steerer," a person who screens potential drug buyers on the street
to determine whether they are drug users or police officers. 192
Upholding admission of this testimony under Rule 704(a), the Second
Circuit commented:
[T]here is something rather offensive in allowing an investigating
officer to testify not simply that a certain pattern of conduct is
often found in narcotics cases, leaving it for the jury to determine
whether the defendant's conduct fits the pattern, but also that such
conduct fitted that pattern, at least when other inferences could
have been drawn not unreasonably although perhaps not as reason-
ably as that to which the expert testified.' 93
The appellate court's objection boils down to a sense that the jury,
despite the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine and present
opposing expert theories and despite the charge of the judge, might
have given undue weight to the testimony of the expert. The court,
following the precedent of its earlier cases, chose not to declare the
testimony prejudicial and exclude it under Rule 403.194 Nonetheless,
this ruling, like the ruling in King '95 and the district court rulings in
Zenith, 196 Vucinich, 197 and Lueben, 198 demonstrates that the courts
have not abandoned their concern that expert witnesses will usurp the
role of the jury. Although the common law rule against ultimate issue
192. Id. at 400.
193. Id. at 401 (footnote omitted). The drug deal was part of a police operation. Id. at 399.
An undercover police officer, who was later the expert witness at the trial, approached a drug
seller on the street and asked to buy heroin. Id. After discussion with the defendant, the seller
agreed to the deal, took money from the officer, went into a nearby hotel, and came back with
the drugs. Id. In a footnote, the court listed four other plausible explanations for the
defendant's conduct: (1) that the defendant was a friend but not a partner of the drug seller; (2)
that the defendant wanted to buy drugs himself and was simply trying to get the customer/
officer out of his way; (3) that the defendant wanted to get the drug transaction done with so
that he and the seller could do something else; or (4) that the seller was acting in the dual role
of procurer and steerer for another seller in the hotel and there was no need for the defendant
to act as steerer. Id. at 401 n.5.
194. Id. at 401-02 (following United States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 744, 752-53, 760 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985); United States v. Carson, 702 F.2d 351, 369 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1108 (1983), and distinguishing United States v. Sette, 334 F.2d
267, 269 (2d Cir. 1964)).
195. 642 F. Supp. 288 (W.D. Pa. 1986); see supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text.
196. 505 F. Supp. 1313 (E.D. Pa. 1980), incorporated by reference, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), rev'd in part sub nor. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.
197. See Vucinich, 803 F.2d at 461; supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
198. See Lueben, 812 F.2d at 183; supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
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testimony is banished from the federal courts, the judicial concern
that brought forth the now discredited rule lives on in the minds of
some federal judges.
C. Exclusion Based on "Conclusion of Law" Testimony
1. THEORY OF THE RULE
In theory, the judge is the sole authority on the law and its inter-
pretation. This simple proposition is so basic to the common law sys-
tem that it scarcely needs repeating. The corollary of this truism is
that an expert witness may not give an opinion to the court or the jury
on an issue of law:199
In order to justify having courts resolve disputes between litigants,
it must be posited as an a priori assumption that there is one, but
only one, legal answer for every cognizable dispute. There being
only one applicable legal rule for each dispute or issue, it requires
only one spokesman of the law, who of course is the judge.... To
allow anyone other than the judge to state the law would violate
the basic concept. Reducing the proposition to a more practical
level, it would be a waste of time if witnesses or counsel should
duplicate the judge's statement of the law, and it would intolerably
confound the jury to have it stated differently. 2°
Issues, however, do not come with labels that tell a judge
whether they are issues of fact or issues of law, and the distinction is
sometimes difficult to make.2°' Professor Stoebuck pointed out in
1964 that many courts had excluded testimony based on the common
law ultimate fact rule when the testimony actually dealt with an issue
of law or a mixed issue of fact and law.20 2 Other courts, in their
eagerness to discard the ultimate fact rule, had sanctioned opinions on
the law, mistaking them for opinions of fact.203
The Federal Rules of Evidence deal indirectly with opinions on
questions of law. Rule 704(a) allows for the admission of testimony
that "embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. ' ' 204
It does not specifically refer to an "issue of fact" or to an "issue of
law." The advisory committee's note points out that Rules 701
199. The older evidence treatises appear to take this proposition for granted, not
mentioning it at all or passing it off in a brief reference. Greenleaf, for example, simply said
that "witnesses are not receivable to state their views on matters of legal or moral obligation."
S. GREENLEAF, supra note 123, § 441, at 491.
200. Stoebuck, supra note 121, at 237.
201. See supra notes 135 & 173-79 and accompanying text.
202. Stoebuck, supra note 121, at 237 & n.78.
203. Id. at 237-38 & n.79.
204. FED. R. EvID. 704(a).
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(Opinion Testimony by Lay Witnesses), 702 (Testimony by Experts),
and 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice,
Confusion, or Waste of Time), used in combination, limit the inclu-
sive thrust of Rule 704:
[These Rules] ... stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms
of inadequately explored legal criteria. Thus the question, "Did T
have capacity to make a will?" would be excluded, while the ques-
tion, "Did T have sufficient mental capacity to know the nature
and extent of his property and the natural objects of his bounty and
to formulate a rational scheme of distribution?" would be
allowed.2 °5
This often cited formulation attempts to illustrate the conceptual
difference between an admissible conclusion of fact and an inadmissi-
ble conclusion couched in legal terminology. Testamentary capacity,
the "capacity to make a will," is defined by statute and case law.2" If
a jury is called upon to determine whether T, a testator, had the
capacity to make a will, the judge will instruct it as to the legal stan-
dard against which it must evaluate the evidence. Typically, that for-
mulation will approximate the one used in the advisory committee's
example.20 7 In a hypothetical jurisdiction defining testamentary
capacity in the language of the example, the judge would tell the jury
that it must determine, based on all the evidence presented, whether T
had sufficient mental capacity to (1) know the nature and extent of his
property; (2) know the natural objects of his bounty; and (3) formu-
late a rational scheme of distribution. The jury would be directed to
find that T had the capacity to make a will if it determined that the
answers to all three of the stated inquiries were affirmative, and that T
did not have the capacity to make a will if it determined that the
answer to any of the inquiries were negative.
If the expert witness is permitted to state his opinion on all the
questions of fact that the jury will have to answer in order to arrive at
its ultimate conclusion on testamentary capacity, why should the
court not go the next step and allow the expert to state the legal con-
clusion that is impelled by his answers to the questions of fact? Or, to
phrase the question in a more compelling form: If the expert's
answers to factual questions, once applied to the correct legal stan-
dard, impel a certain conclusion, has the expert not, in effect, already
205. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1973) (citing
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 (E. Cleary ed. 1984)).
206. 1 W. BOVE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 12.15, at 592-93 (1960).
207. Id. § 12.21, at 608-09; see, e.g., In re Estate of Edwards, 433 So. 2d 1349, 1350 (Fla.
5th DCA 1983).
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stated a conclusion of law, even if he has not used legal nomenclature
to phrase his answers?
The answer is that the witness is not qualified as an expert on the
law. 2 8 The court cannot assume that he knows, fully understands,
and applies the legal criteria for "capacity to make a will" exactly as
the court will instruct the jury to do. This is what the advisory com-
mittee means by "inadequately explored legal criteria. ' 2 9  If the
expert does not explain the underlying basis of his conclusion, the jury
does not know exactly what he means, because his notion of "capacity
to make a will" might be entirely different from what is required by
the law. If, on the other hand, he does explain the basis of his conclu-
sion and then he goes on to draw the conclusion, he also is stating his
interpretation of the legal criteria, thereby encroaching on the author-
ity of the judge.
2. CASE ANALYSIS
Although the advisory committee's example seems simple
enough, the federal courts have reached inconsistent results in trying
to separate permissible opinions of fact from impermissible opinions
of law. The cases fall, though not neatly, into three general groups:
First, the expert witness may try to state an opinion on the current
status of the law on a particular subject. Such testimony is almost
always excluded. Second, the expert witness may state an opinion
that is essentially factual in nature but that incorporates words or
phrases with specific legal definitions. Generally, this testimony will
be admitted if the court believes that the legally defined word can be
understood by the jury in a more familiar context that does not
depend on the legal definition. Third, the expert may try to state,
using legal criteria, a conclusion that is essentially the same as the
legal conclusion the jury will be asked to reach. This situation is
essentially the one contemplated in the advisory committee's example
and it is in cases of this type that the courts have struggled.210
208. Indeed, because the judge alone has that role, the witness by definition cannot be
qualified as an expert on the law.
209. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
210. The second and third categories are distinguished essentially by the difference between
an opinion of fact and an opinion of law. Because the line between these is not always easy to
draw, see supra note 114, the two categories tend to overlap at the edges. Although there
appear to be two distinctly different kinds of cases, some look as though they might fit into
either group. In those cases, the reader may disagree with the author's attempt at
classification.
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a. Witness Tries to State the Law
In cases in which the law is unusually technical or complex, par-
ties may attempt to convince the jury that a certain course of conduct
was lawful or unlawful, based on an expert's statement of how the law
applies in that particular context. Such testimony implies that the law
of the case is in dispute and that the jury may decide the issue based
on its interpretation of the law, as explained by the expert.
This situation arose in Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc. 211 In
1967, Diners' Club acquired a travel agency from Marx in return for
unregistered stock of Diners' Club and other consideration. 2, 2 The
agreement between the parties provided in substance that on the
request of Marx, Diners' Club would "promptly" file a registration
statement for the stock and use its "best efforts" to cause the registra-
tion statement to become effective.21 3 Marx requested registration in
1969.214 In 1970, when it appeared that no registration would be
effected, Marx sued, alleging breach of contract.21 5
One claim made by Marx was that Diners' Club had unduly
delayed before finally filing a registration statement in August 1969.2 16
Diners' defense was that it had filed within the time permitted under
the contract.2 17 As a rebuttal witness, Marx called a securities lawyer
who testified that, pursuant to the contract, the statement should have
been filed by June 20, 1969 and should have been effective by August
1969.2 s In justifying his conclusion, the securities expert said:
I construe "best efforts" in the context of a covenant to register
shares as the assumption on the part of the person who gives the
covenant an absolute, unconditional responsibility, to set to work
promptly and diligently to do everything that would have to be
done to make the registration statement effective.219
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
211. 400 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd in part, 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 861 (1977).
212. Id. at 583.
213. The contract included several conditions precedent and conditions subsequent,
modifying the obligation of Diners' Club to register the stock. One condition precedent, a
requirement that Marx pay one-half the cost of registration, was an issue in the case, but the
disputed expert testimony was not related to that issue. Id. at 583 n.1, 585.
214. Id. at 583-84.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 584 n.2.
217. Id. at 586.
218. Id.
219. Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 509 (2d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added
by the court of appeals), rev'g in part 400 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
861 (1977).
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that the witness, as an expert on securities law, could have testified as
to the ordinary practices and procedures used in preparing registra-
tion statements. 20 Such testimony would have assisted the jury in
evaluating Diners' conduct against normal industry standards.221
But, said the court, the expert's testimony was of an entirely different
character:
[H]e gave his opinion as to the legal standards which he believed to
be derived from the contract and which should have governed Din-
ers' conduct. He testified not so much as to common practice as to
what was necessary "to fulfill the covenant" [of the contract].
"The question of interpretation of the contract is for the
jury and the question of legal effect is for the judge. In neither case
do we permit expert testimony. '222
220. Id. at 509.
221. Id. Note that this type of testimony parallels the testimony given by physicians in
medical malpractice cases. Presumably, using the same analogy, the securities expert would
have been within bounds if he had compared Diners' conduct with normal industry standards
and had stated an opinion as to whether Diners' conduct conformed. The Second Circuit did
not address this possibility. The weakness of the analogy is that physicians establish and
regulate their own standards of practice to a much greater extent than does the securities
industry. See infra Section IV(B).
222. Id. at 509-10 (quoting Loeb v. Hammond, 407 F.2d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 1969)). The
distinction raised between the role of the jury and the role of the judge raises an interesting
question: Was the securities expert's testimony interpretation, a matter for the jury, or
construction, a matter for the court? The question at issue was the meaning of the term "best
efforts." The Second Restatement of Contracts provides rules for determining the meaning of
a written agreement:
(1) The interpretation of an integrated agreement is directed to the meaning
of the terms of the writing ....
(2) A question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be
determined by the trier of fact if it depends on the credibility of extrinsic evidence
or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence.
Otherwise a question of interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be
determined as a question of law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 (1979).
There is no indication in the case report that the written contract was not an integrated
agreement, as defined in section 209 of the Second Restatement of Contracts. Given the usual
formality of securities transactions, it is reasonable to assume that the writing was an inte-
grated agreement.
The Restatement suggests that if there are two reasonable meanings that could be
attached to the "best efforts" clause, then it would be appropriate to present extrinsic evidence
to the jury and allow it to decide which meaning was intended by the parties:
Analytically, what meaning is attached to a word or other symbol by one or more
people is a question of fact. But general usage as to the meaning of words in the
English language is commonly a proper subject for judicial notice without the aid
of evidence extrinsic to the writing. Historically, moreover, partly perhaps
because of the fact that jurors were often illiterate, questions of interpretation of
written documents have been treated as questions of law in the sense that they
are decided by the trial judge rather than by the jury.
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The logic is slightly muddied by the fact that the expert witness
was expressing his opinion of a contract, rather than of statutory or
case law. The court stated, however, that construction of a contract is
the equivalent of interpretation of the law-a matter out of the hands
of the jury and therefore off limits for witnesses.223
It is instructive to contrast Marx with United States v. Jensen
22 4
and Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. ,225 cases stating
that the privately promulgated rules and regulations of the securities
industry are not matters of law and may be interpreted by an expert
witness.2 26 The facts of the two cases are similar. The defendants
were accused of fraud in the sale of securities. 22 7 At trial, the defend-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 comment d (1979).
If the court was asserting that "best efforts" had but one judicially cognizable meaning,
then under the Restatement view, the matter ends there. If other views were possible, then one
could make a good argument that the securities expert should have been allowed to testify as to
what would be a reasonable interpretation of the phrase in the usual usage of securities agree-
ments. Nevertheless, even in that case, the court could still find fault with his statement
phrased as "I construe," amounting to a conclusion based on "inadequately explored legal
criteria."
223. The Second Circuit also pointed out that ifa witness is allowed to state an opinion on a
matter of law, the usual checks and balances inherent in the adversary system break down.
Cross-examination is an invitation to disaster because an obstinate expert would merely repeat
his statements and reinforce the potentially incorrect impression made on the jury. Opposing
experts would be equally inappropriate: "With the growth of intricate securities litigation over
the past forty years, we must be especially careful not to allow trials before juries to become
battles of paid advocates posing as experts on the respective sides concerning matters of
domestic law." Marx, 550 F.2d at 511; accord Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359
(4th Cir. 1986). Buyers of limited partnership interests in an oil and gas drilling venture that
went bad sued the investment banking firm that syndicated the partnership units. Id. at 361-
62. Plaintiffs claimed that the syndicator had violated securities laws by failing to disclose
material information at the time of the offering. Id. at 362. The syndicator was not permitted
to introduce the testimony of an attorney to the effect that there was no legal requirement that
the omitted information bb disclosed. Id. at 365. The Fourth Circuit affirmed exclusion of the
testimony, citing Marx as authority, and said:
While this case turns on the applicability and meaning of the securities laws, the
issue . . . has a far broader reach . . . . If such experts are to testify to the
meaning and applicability of securities laws, what line is to be drawn to exclude
tort lawyers from offering their expert opinions to the jury as to the meaning and
applicability of the laws governing tort litigation? Examples of this sort could be
multiplied across the gamut of litigation.
Id. at 366.
224. 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979).
225. 803 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1986).
226. Vucinich, 803 F.2d at 461; Jensen, 608 F.2d at 1356. In Vucinich, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the trial court's exclusion of the testimony. 803 F.2d at 462. In Jensen, the Tenth
Circuit upheld the trial court's admission of the testimony. 608 F.2d at 1356. Vucinich was a
civil case. 803 F.2d at 456. Jensen was a criminal case. 608 F.2d at 1352. These distinctions
do not appear to make any difference for purpose of the present discussion. For a discussion of
Vucinich regarding the ultimate issue of fact rule, see supra notes 165-72 and accompanying
text.
227. Vucinich, 803 F.2d at 456-58; Jensen, 608 F.2d at 1352.
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ants objected to expert witness testimony interpreting the rules of the
National Association of Security Dealers and reaching conclusions as
to how the defendants' conduct related to those rules.22 8
The Vucinich court commented that the rules were "highly rele-
vant and far from prejudicial 'because the rules reflect the standard to
which all brokers are held.' . . . Not being civil law, these rules were
proper matters for expert testimony." '229 This statement presents a
curious paradox. These cases concerning industry rules can be recon-
ciled with the logic of Marx only because a contract is held to be the
private law of the parties, and as such, enforceable by the courts. The
rules of an industry association, however, are voluntary among its
members, and not having any status as law, are enforced only by sanc-
tions the association might choose to impose. But the courts view the
industry rules as relevant because they reflect the standard to which
all brokers are held. This implies that the jury might be called upon
to give the rules the effect of law and sanction the defendant for his
failure to adhere to them. On this level, the cases demonstrate how
fine the line between fact and law becomes and how difficult it is for a
court to draw that line in a way that stands up to comparative
analysis.
An interesting line of cases presents one small exception to the
absolute proscription of expert testimony on the law: Situations in
which confusion about the law may have influenced a party's conduct.
In United States v. Garber,23° the defendant was prosecuted for
income tax evasion because she failed to report large amounts of
money she received for selling blood plasma. 23' The main issue in the
case was whether the tax law considered the transactions to be taxable
sales of a product or service, or nontaxable exchanges of property for
other property of equivalent value.232 Garber argued that the law was
so unsettled on the point that she could not have acted willfully in
failing to report as income the money she received. 233 Garber and the
228. Vucinich, 803 F.2d at 461; Jensen, 608 F.2d at 1356. In Vucinich, the expert witness
also discussed the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. 803 F.2d at 461. Testimony
regarding both sets of rules was included in the same objection by defendant and was
considered as a unit by the court. Id.
229. Vucinich, 803 F.2d at 461 (quoting Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 824
(9th Cir. 1980)).
230. 607 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1979).
231. Id. at 93-94. Garber was one of only two or three persons in the world known to have
in her blood a particular antibody that was extremely useful to blood banks. Three different
pharmaceutical companies competed with each other for the right to buy her blood plasma.
As a result, she was paid $80,200, $71,400, and $87,200 for the three years covered by the
indictment. Id. at 94 & n.l.
232. Id. at 95.
233. Id. at 96.
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government both proffered experts with opposing views of the law.2 34
The trial judge excluded both and finally ruled as a matter of law that
the sale of Garber's blood produced taxable income.235
The exclusions were reversed on appeal because the expert testi-
mony was an essential element of Garber's challenge to the willfulness
236 Uielement of the alleged crime. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit declared:
[T]he unresolved nature of the law is relevant to show that defend-
ant may not have been aware of a tax liability or may have simply
made an error in judgment. Furthermore, the relevance of a dis-
pute in the law does not depend on whether the defendant actually
knew of the conflict.237
The Ninth Circuit followed Garber in United States v. Clardy,238
a tax fraud case. In Clardy, an Internal Revenue Service agent was
permitted to testify that a particular type of interest payment was
"not deductible. ' 239 The statement was relevant to rebut the defend-
ant's argument that he could not have acted willfully because deduct-
ibility of the interest was a subject of legitimate dispute. 2 °
In another tax case, United States v. Ingredient Technology
Corp.,241 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
both distinguished and rejected Garber.242 The defendant was
accused of illegally manipulating inventories shown on its books in
order to evade taxation.243 It tried to attack the "willfulness" element
of the charge by introducing expert testimony that the law was uncer-
tain in this area.2" The court first found that, unlike Garber, the
defendant in this case genuinely thought that what it was doing was
unlawful; therefore, it could not claim to have not acted willfully.
2 45
Second, the court said that any actual controversy about the state of
the law was not a proper basis for a determination of willfulness, and
therefore, not a proper subject for expert testimony.246 Only the sub-
jective state of mind of the defendant determined the willfulness of its
234. Id. at 94-95.
235. Id. at 94-96.
236. Id. at 99.
237. Id. at 98.
238. 612 F.2d 1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 1980).
239. Id. at 1153.
240. Id. at 1152-53.
241. 698 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1131 (1983).
242. Id. at 97.
243. Id. at 89.
244. Id. at 96.
245. Id. at 97.
246. Id.
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conduct.24 7
The correct position may lie somewhere between the extremes
represented by Garber and Ingredient Technology. It is difficult to see
why legal uncertainty is relevant to determine the defendant's willful
intent if the defendant was unaware of the debate. But if the defend-
ant could show that he knew the law was in dispute, then evidence
presenting the conflicting points of view and explaining why the
defendant adopted one view or another might be probative.
247. Id. The Second Circuit said:
We agree with the Garber dissent, 607 F.2d at 105, that it would be very
confusing to a jury to have opposing opinions of law admitted into evidence as
involving a factual question for them to decide. Indeed, as that dissent points
out, the inevitable logic of the majority's decision in Garber is that if the tax law
is uncertain, the indictment should be dismissed.
Id.
Judicial interpretation and criticism of Garber did not end with Ingredient Technology.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found no error in the exclusion of a
tax professor's testimony that a defendant's "theory and belief that wages are not taxable
income was not implausible." United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 443 (5th Cir. 1984).
Evidence that others shared the defendant's belief may be relevant to the credibility of the
defendant's claim that he held the belief, the Fifth Circuit explained. Id. The proffered testi-
mony was potentially prejudicial and confusing, however, and it was within the trial judge's
discretion to exclude it under the balancing standard of Rule 403. Id. The court held that the
defendant in Burton, unlike the defendant in Garber, must show that he actually believed or
relied on another person's belief that the law was uncertain in order to use legal uncertainty as
a defense. Id. at 444. Garber was different from Burton, the court said, because of Garber's
"unique, indeed near bizarre" facts. Id. In Garber, the level of uncertainty in the law was so
high and so widely recognized that the court was able virtually to presume that the defendant
was aware of it without any evidentiary showing. Id. Absent a showing, as in Garber, that the
law was so uncertain as to approach the level of vagueness, the court stated, it is only margin-
ally relevant to show that there is an abstract question of legal uncertainty of which the
defendant is unaware. Thus, the court said, Garber is to be read narrowly and limited to its
facts. Id.
In other circuits, courts of appeals have rejected or declined to follow Garber, pointing
out that it is the defendant's state of mind, not the confused state of the law, that is relevant to
proving willfulness and that any statement of the law or confusion therein should be made by
the court, not by witnesses. United States v. Curtis, 782 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1985).
Rule 704(b), adopted in 1984, might have some effect on future cases in which defendants
confront charges that include an element of willfulness. Apparently, no expert witness could
state the conclusion that, because the law on a particular issue was undecided, the defendant
was unable to form willful intent. See infra Section III(D). In the cases cited, however, there
was no attempt to go that far. The expert witnesses were proffered only to state interpretations
of the law, leaving it to counsel to argue to the jury that lack of willful intent should be
inferred. Furthermore, willful intent could also be an issue in a civil action, in which Rule
704(b) would not apply. It seems likely, therefore, that the use of expert testimony to establish
the defendant's state of mind in light of uncertain legal interpretation will continue to come up
as a possible exception to the rule against testimony on issues of law.
[Vol. 42:831
SCOPE OF ADMISSIBLE EXPERT TESTIMONY
b. Witness States a Factual Conclusion Using Legally Defined
Words
At the opposite extreme from cases in which the witness tries to
state a rule of law are cases in which the witness tries to state an
essentially factual opinion using words that have legal definitions. If
the court concludes that the jury will understand the words in some
context other than their legal usage, then generally it will permit the
testimony.
This situation occurred in Hogan v. American Telephone & Tele-
graph Co. 48 The plaintiff, a black female accountant, filed suit alleg-
ing that she had been demoted by her employer because of her race
and gender and that the employer had taken retaliatory action after
she filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission.249 The employer claimed that she had been demoted because
of inferior job performance.2 '0 At the trial, the employer asked sev-
eral witnesses "whether they had observed any discriminatory acts by
... supervisors" working for the employer, and it asked supervisors
"whether they had intended to discriminate." '251 Although the
employee objected that the questions called for "legal conclusions,"
the trial court allowed the testimony.252 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, but noted that it might have
been error to admit the testimony:
Because the judge and not a witness is to instruct the factfinder on
the applicable principles of law, exclusion of opinion testimony is
appropriate if the terms used have a separate, distinct, and special
legal meaning. This is true of the term "discriminate." The task of
separating questions calling for permissible factual responses from
those calling for impermissible legal conclusions is not easy.2 53
The court found that reversal was not necessary because the trial
court had rendered harmless any error by instructing the witness to
answer the questions concerning race discrimination "on the basis of
the lay version of the term: that people are treated differently because
of their race."'254 The employee accepted this definition for purposes
of the witness' testimony.255
248. 812 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1987).
249. Id. at 410.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 411. In this case, the witnesses were lay persons, not experts, but the evidentiary
ruling is consistent with similar cases involving expert witnesses.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted).
254. Id. at 412.
255. Id.
19881
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Courts also have overruled objections to testimony couched in
legal terms by observing that a jury of lay persons would not be mis-
led by the use of a legal term because its plain meaning in every day
speech matches its legal meaning. Following this rationale, a police
narcotics officer was permitted to testify in one case that the quantity
of cocaine found on the defendant at the time of his arrest was "a
quantity that would be possessed with intent to distribute. ' 2 6  In
another case, a physician was permitted to testify that an assault vic-
tim had suffered "serious bodily injury. ' 2 7 And in yet another case, a
psychologist and a psychiatrist were permitted to testify that the
defendant, accused of bank robbery, had acted "voluntarily," not "in
fear of her life," and "of her own free will." '258
There is yet another group of cases in which the court found
that, although the witness reached a conclusion using a term of law,
his statement must properly be understood in another context, com-
pletely disregarding the legal meaning. This is not quite the same as
saying that the jury will not be confused because it will automatically
tend to attach the correct meaning to the term. Instead, the court is
saying that because of the broader context of the witness' testimony,
the jury will understand that he did not mean the word in a legal
sense but in some other sense.
256. United States v. Kelly, 679 F.2d 135, 136 (8th Cir. 1982).
257. United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 1224, 1246-47 (9th Cir. 1980). The defendant was
accused of violating the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(f), 1153 (1976) (current version
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(f), 1153 (1982)), which provide for punishment of an Indian who commits
"assault resulting in serious bodily injury" upon another Indian. Johnson, 637 F.2d at 1228 &
nn. 1-2.
258. United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1351 (9th Cir. 1977), cerl. denied, 435 U.S.
1000 (1978). This was the celebrated case of kidnap victim Patricia Hearst, who participated
with her captors in the commission of several crimes, including the bank robbery at issue.
Hearst claimed that she had been forced into her role in the bank robbery, despite the fact that
she carried a weapon into the bank and despite videotapes released by her kidnappers in which
she claimed to have acted voluntarily. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to
admit expert testimony in opposition to Hearst's contention:
[Hearst] contends that the question, "Did [Hearst] voluntarily rob the bank?" is
legally and conceptually identical to the question, "Did T have capacity to make
a will?" [referring to the advisory committee's example of testimony that should
be excluded because it is phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria,
see supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text] thus requiring exclusion of the
question and the opinion it elicited.
We disagree. The Advisory Committee's phrase "inadequately explored
legal criteria" refers to terminology, the meaning of which is not reasonably clear
to laymen.... The terms "voluntarily rob a bank" or "act under fear of death or
grave bodily harm" do not suffer from that same disability. The average layman
would understand those terms and ascribe to them essentially the same meaning
intended by the expert witness.
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In United States v. Milton,259 the defendants were accused of con-
ducting an illegal bookmaking operation.260 The government's expert
witness gave his interpretations of recorded conversations to which
the defendants were parties.26' Quoting from a transcript, the witness
testified that one defendant had said, "A friend of mine gave me Flor-
ida .... I'll hold a couple of dollars on that myself. ' 262 The witness
then concluded that these remarks indicated that the defendant was
"a part of the gambling business. ' 263 The defendant objected that the
statement was a legal conclusion. 264 Admitting that, taken out of con-
text, the testimony seemed more like a legal than a factual conclusion,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit nevertheless
upheld admission of the testimony:
[T]he statement is more amenable to interpretation as an empirical
observation that a commissioned bookmaker is characteristically
part of a central bookmaking operation. The statement was not
likely taken as promoting a legal doctrine that for purposes of
§ 1955 one who passes on bets for profit necessarily conducts the
central gambling business. Indeed, the witness mentioned neither
§ 1955 nor any of its operative terms. 265
Similarly, in United States v. Fogg,266 a tax evasion case, a Treas-
ury agent testified, "Without any other evidence those monies...
would be considered constructive dividend [sic] to the taxpayer. ' 267
Over the defendant's objection that this was a legal conclusion, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the
witness "merely stated his opinion as an accountant, and did not
attempt to assume the role of the court. '268 Because the trial judge
gave the jury the customary instruction that it was not to accord unu-
sual deference to the testimony of expert witnesses and because the
witness did not attempt to couch his statement in the form of judicial
instructions to the jury, it was not likely that the jury would take it as
anything more than an accountant's opinion.269
259. 555 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1977).
260. Id. at 1199.
261. Id. at 1203.
262. Id. at 1204.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. 652 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982).
267. Id. at 556.
268. Id. at 556-57.
269. Id. at 557. To reinforce that holding, the Fifth Circuit also pointed out that any
accountant today who could not give a competent opinion with reference to the tax laws would
be seriously risking malpractice liability. Id. The court may have proved its argument too
well. It was implying that accountants are professionally trained to give opinions on matters
1988)
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Finally, United States v. Miller "0 is a somewhat mystifying opin-
ion because it treats an issue of inadequately explored legal criteria as
if it were simply a matter of factual opinion. 27 1 The defendant was
accused of interstate transportation of securities, knowing that they
had been taken by fraud.2 72 The government's expert witness, an
accountant, was asked to consider all of the testimony on the record
and state an opinion as an accountant as to whether the bond money
in question had been obtained by fraud.2 7 3 The defendant objected
that the question "usurp[ed] the province of the jury. ' 27 4 The trial
judge overruled the objection, observing that the Federal Rules of
Evidence permitted testimony on the ultimate question to be
presented to the jury.2 5 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit indicated its approval of this ruling, citing Rule 704.276
Neither court mentioned that the witness was asked to frame his
response in terms of the word "fraud. ' 27 7 The defense attorney and
the trial and appellate judges did not even question whether the
accountant knew the legal definition of "fraud" for purposes of the
statute, or whether the jury would be led to believe that the account-
ant was using the word "fraud" in exactly the same sense as that in
which the judge would instruct the jury to use it during
deliberations.27 8
Taken as a group, all of the cases discussed in this subsection
illustrate judicial recognition of the essentially inclusive bias of article
VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Judges, faced with situations in
which the common law rule might have called for exclusion, find rea-
of tax law. If so, even if the witness were speaking as an accountant, he gave an opinion on the
law.
270. 600 F.2d 498 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 955 (1979).
27 1. Id. at 500. For a discussion of the concept of inadequately explored legal criteria, see
supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
272. The government charged that the defendant had violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2314 (1976)
(currently at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 2314 (1982) in same form Miller, 600 F.2d at 499.
273. Miller, 600 F.2d at 500.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. The defendant conceded on appeal that the question posed to the expert witness was
not improper. Id. at 500. Therefore, the court's statement regarding the ultimate issue rule
was dictum. The apparently casual analysis at the appellate level may have occurred because
there was no need to rule formally on this precise question. The defendant asked the court to
find instead that the testimony was inadmissible because the witness had based his opinion in
part on charts that reflected assumptions that were not supported by the evidence. Id This
appeal failed because the defendant had not objected when the charts were introduced during
the trial. Id.
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sons that occasionally border on the creative to admit the disputed
testimony.
c. Witness States a Conclusion Employing Legal Criteria
Cases in which a witness tries to state a conclusion employing
legal criteria most closely fit the paradigm of the testamentary capac-
ity example given in the advisory committee's note to Rule 704.279
This is exactly the kind of case in which the advisory committee sug-
gested excluding expert testimony. Predictably, the testimony often is
excluded, but there are some surprising exceptions.
The leading case in support of the advisory committee's interpre-
tation is Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 280 The plaintiff was the owner/
operator of a bulldozer who contracted to clear a tract of land of
stumps, logs, and debris. 281' Before he began digging, the plaintiff
made note of signs on both sides of the property warning that an
underground gas pipeline traversed the land, but he assumed that the
pipeline was buried in a straight line between the two signs, some dis-
tance from where he planned to work. In fact, the pipeline made a
sharp curve under the property and actually crossed the area where
the plaintiff was digging.282 The blade of the bulldozer struck the
pipeline, resulting in an explosion that severely injured the plaintiff.283
The plaintiff sued the pipeline company, claiming that the pipe-
line was not buried deep enough, that its location was not adequately
marked, and that the company had been on notice that he was clear-
ing the land, and therefore, was under an affirmative duty to warn
him.284 The company's primary defense was contributory negligence,
based on a claim that the plaintiff was under a duty to investigate
further to determine the location of the pipeline before digging. 285 At
trial, the company qualified an expert in the installation and mainte-
nance of gas gathering systems and asked him to state his opinion as
to the cause of the accident, based on all of the evidence that had been
presented.286 The plaintiff objected, and the trial judge excluded the
answer, commenting that there was a difference between "an ultimate
279. See supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text. Note that United States v. Spaulding,
293 U.S. 498 (1935), often cited as an example of the Supreme Court's adoption of the
common law rule excluding expert testimony on an issue of ultimate fact, more properly fits
into this group. See supra notes 129-35 & 145 and accompanying text.
280. 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983).
281. Id. at 237.
282. Id. at 237-38.
283. Id. at 238.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 239.
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issue" and "the ultimate issue. ''2s7 The question of the cause of the
accident went to "the ultimate issue" for jury determination, and
therefore could not be addressed by a witness.288
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the trial court's ruling, but on different grounds. The court pointed
out that the trial court's "ultimate issue" logic contradicted Rule
704.29 Instead, the appellate court said, the testimony should be
excluded because it was more like the first, impermissible, question in
the advisory committee's testamentary capacity example than like the
second, permissible, question:290
The court was well justified in concluding that the attorney's ques-
tion sought from the witness his opinion as to the legal, not a fac-
tual "cause of the accident." This is so because there was no
dispute in the evidence as to the factual cause of the mishap: [The
plaintiff] ran into the pipeline with his bulldozer. Thus, this makes
it obvious that the attorney was asking the witness to opine that
[the plaintiff] was contributorily negligent. Whether or not [the
plaintiff's] acts were the "cause of the accident" is the issue the
jury must resolve after appropriate legal instructions by the
court.2 9 '
Further emphasizing the correlation between the case at hand
and the advisory committee's example, the court stated with approval
that the pipeline company had also asked the witness to comment on
whether he considered the usual practices of land clearing contractors
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 239-40.
290. Id. at 240; see supra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
291. Owen, 698 F.2d at 240. The court's statement on causation is somewhat facile.
Arguably, the accident would not have occurred had the pipeline company buried the pipeline
deeper in the ground, marked its route more clearly, or warned the bulldozer operator when it
learned that he was clearing the property, or if the bulldozer operator had inquired as to the
exact location of the pipeline. The nonoccurrence of each of these events, therefore, may be
considered a link in the chain of causation in fact. The court appears to be saying that the
question addressed to the witness as to the cause of the accident was really a question about the
existence of an operator's duty to inquire, an element of the tort of negligence that is different
from the causation element. If the jury were to determine that there was such a duty, then it
would be virtually the equivalent of determining that the operator was contributorily
negligent, because there was no apparent issue as to the other elements of his contributory
negligence: breach of the duty, causation, or damage. Applying this analysis, the witness was
not asked to state an opinion using the word "cause" in its legally defined sense. Rather, he
was asked to state an opinion that, if it were sufficiently influential, would determine the jury's
decision on the issue of contributory negligence. In other words, the question asked of the
expert witness calls for an opinion on an intermediate, but determinative issue of law: whether
the plaintiff was under a duty to inquire. On this basis, the court reasonably might have found
that the answer to the proposed question would have been based on inadequately explored
legal criteria, and therefore, was excluded properly.
[Vol. 42:831
SCOPE OF ADMISSIBLE EXPERT TESTIMONY
in locating buried pipelines to be safe.292 This question, the Fifth Cir-
cuit said, called for a factual, not a legal conclusion and therefore the
trial court was correct in overruling plaintiff's objection.2 93
Similarly, in Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. ,294 a person-
nel expert testified that the defendant employer had discharged the
plaintiff from employment because of his age and that the discharge
constituted "unlawful" age discrimination. 29 On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it was proper
for the expert to state his opinion as to the cause of the discharge, but
suggested in dicta that it was arguably improper for him to conclude
that the discharge was unlawful. 296 Although the court made note of
Owen, it seemed more concerned with the fact that the witness was
shown to have no expertise in age discrimination or knowledge of the
statute297 under which the action was brought. 29  The court did not
determine whether the testimony as to the unlawfulness of the dis-
charge was an opinion based on unexplored legal criteria, and as such,
inadmissible.2 99 The decision left open two important questions:
Would a witness shown to be an expert on the law of age discrimina-
tion in employment have been permitted to state his opinion on the
lawfulness of the discharge? And if not, would in-court exploration of
the legal criteria for unlawful age discrimination before presentation
of the testimony have made such an opinion admissible? The Sixth
Circuit's citation to Owen coupled with its reluctance to apply the
Owen holding in this case suggests that the court may be willing to
reject the prohibition of opinion testimony based on unexplored legal
292. Owen, 698 F.2d at 240.
293. Id. This question, like the excluded question as to the cause of the accident, appears to
be asking whether bulldozer operators are under a duty to inquire further before clearing land
marked by pipeline warning signs. See supra note 291. The permitted question is one step
further removed from the conclusion than the excluded question in that it asks about operators
generally, whereas the excluded question asked about the duty of the plaintiff when engaged in
the conduct that led to the accident at issue. Because neither the permitted word "safe," nor
the excluded word "cause," was used in a legally defined sense, and because each was serving
as a proxy for the legally defined word "duty," it is questionable whether the court's
distinction between the question admitted and the question excluded is meaningful.
294. 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
295. Id. at 918 n.l, 919.
296. Id. at 919-20. The court held that even if the testimony that the discharge was
unlawful was improperly admitted, the error was harmless because, first, the witness'
credibility as an authority on the law of employment discrimination was effectively impeached
in cross-examination, and second, the jury was instructed that it could "totally disregard" such
opinion if it found the opinion unsound for any reason. Id. at 920.
297. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982).
298. Davis, 742 F.2d at 918-20.
299. Id. at 919-20.
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criteria in a future case that presents the issue squarely.3"
A recent opinion issued by a three judge panel of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the Owen and
advisory committee position entirely, but the panel's holding on this
issue was reversed by the full court, after rehearing the case en banc.
In Specht v. Jensen,30 1 Ken Jacobs, a private citizen, obtained a state
court order of possession for a computer that had been repossessed by
Timothy Specht, and a writ of assistance directing any sheriff to help
him obtain the computer.3 °2 Jacobs enlisted the aid of several local
police officers who went with him to the business office of Specht's
father and the home of Specht's parents to try to locate the computer,
despite the fact that they had no search warrant.30 3 Jacobs and the
officers entered the office at night, without knowledge or permission of
Specht's father, and "looked around."" °  At the home, they told
Specht's mother that she would be arrested and jailed if she did not
cooperate, refused to allow her to call her lawyer, and "mill[ed]
around the kitchen, and living and dining areas" without permis-
sion.305 Specht's parents brought claims against the police officers
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Colorado law for conducting illegal
300. Cf Haney v. Mizell Memorial Hosp., 744 F.2d 1467, 1473-75 (1 1th Cir. 1984). In a
medical malpractice action, the expert witness, a physician, was permitted to testify that the
defendant's diagnosis and treatment fell below the applicable standard of care but his
conclusion that the defendant was negligent was excluded. The Eleventh Circuit, unable to
determine the exact reason for the trial judge's ruling, advanced two hypotheses: First, that
the opinion as to negligence "would be only marginally helpful to the jury, if helpful at all, or
simply cumulative"; and second, that the district court, not being provided with any
foundation evidence to show that the witness was familiar with the applicable legal standards
for negligence or malpractice, concluded that the witness was asked to testify on the basis of
inadequately explored legal criteria. Id. at 1474. This language suggests that if it had been
shown that the witness were familiar with the applicable legal standard, his testimony on the
mixed issue of law and fact would not have been vulnerable to the objection that it was based
on inadequately explored legal criteria. The court surveyed the conclusions in Owen, 698 F.2d
at 236 (discussed supra notes 280-93 and accompanying text); United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d
551 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (discussed supra notes 266-269
and accompanying text); United States v. Milton, 555 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussed
supra notes 259-65 and accompanying text); and two cases predating the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and concluded that "the law in this circuit pertaining to the admissibility of an
expert's opinion couched in legal terms is not crystal clear." Haney, 744 F.2d at 1474 n.7.
The court's solution was to sidestep the issue by declaring that the exclusion, whether error or
not, was harmless because the testimony that was admitted was "more meaningful, and
probably more damaging to the position of [the defendant] than the opinion [that the plaintiff]
wanted the jury to hear." Id. at 1475.
301. 832 F.2d 1516 (1987), rev'd in part, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
302. Id. at 1519.
303. Id. at 1519-20.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1520.
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searches of the office and home.3 °6 A jury found in favor of the
Spechts, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.30 7
At trial, the Spechts introduced testimony by an expert on the
constitutional law of search and seizure and on criminal procedure, as
to whether the activities of the officers constituted searches, and if so,
whether the searches were illegal.3°8 The officers objected that this
testimony was on an issue of law and that the witness would invade
the province of the court. The court offered to instruct the jury on the
legality of the searches as a matter of law, but the officers declined.30 9
The court then ruled that "if the legality of the searches was a matter
for the jury to decide, [the expert witness] could give his opinion on
that issue within the perimeters of the court's instructions on the
law. ' ' 3 10 The expert testified, in response to hypothetical questions,
that the officers' actions were searches and were illegal.31
On appeal, the officers argued that the expert's testimony
"usurped the province of both the district court and of the jury. ' 3 12
The Tenth Circuit panel found that, under Rules 702 and 704, there
was no merit to the claim that the expert had improperly expressed an
opinion as to the ultimate jury question.313 Furthermore, the panel
held, he did not improperly tell the jury what law to apply:
Defendants pointed out on cross-examination that [the expert's]
opinions were based on his own view of the law, and that [he] did
not know what the court's instructions on the law would be.
Although [the expert] agreed that his view of the law in the area of
search and seizure could very well differ from that of the trial
judge, his definition of an illegal search was essentially the same as
the one the judge gave to the jury. [The expert] further stated that
the trial court's "understanding of the law is controlling in this
case." In addition to instructing the jury that it must apply the law
as stated in the court's instructions, the [trial] court also informed
the jury that it could determine what weight, if any, should be
given to the expert testimony.314
Although the panel declined to rule that the testimony improp-
erly influenced the jury to apply an incorrect legal standard, it is not
entirely clear whether the testimony was saved by the correlation
306. Id. at 1518.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1526.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1526-27.
314. Id. at 1527 (citations omitted).
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between the standard used by the expert and that used by the court,
or whether it was saved by the repeated instructions to the jury that
the jury was to apply the court's standard. It is apparent, however,
that the panel did not object to an expert witness stating to the jury an
opinion based on his application of legal criteria without first estab-
lishing that his understanding of the legal criteria conformed to that
of the court.
Upon rehearing en banc, 315 the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding
that the expert's testimony was inadmissible because it supplanted the
trial court's duty to set forth the law and the jury's ability to apply the
law to the evidence.316 Allowing an attorney, testifying as an expert
witness, to state his opinion of the law would subvert the proper func-
tioning of a jury trial, the court said, because the jury might tend to
believe that the attorney-witness was more knowledgeable than the
judge,3 7 and because the jury might be confused by a "battle of the
experts" on the legal principles applicable to the case. 3 8 The court
pointed out, however, that its holding was limited to expert opinions
on "ultimate issues of law, "319 situations in which the witness
attempts to tell the jury how to decide the case. Expert witnesses may
assist the jury in understanding specific questions of fact, even if the
testimony regarding those issues is couched in legal terms, the court
stated.2°
Given the concern about expert witnesses employing legal crite-
ria in ways that may conflict with the trial court's statement of the
applicable law, why is there ever a justification for allowing an expert
witness to testify in terms of legal criteria? Does such testimony ever
meet the Rule 702 requirement that it assist the trier of fact? It is
submitted that there are many such cases. As a practical matter,
judges are often faced with situations in which the law, even if fully
explained, is difficult to apply to the presented fact pattern.
A case involving federal firearms violations illustrates the prob-
lem. In United States v. Buchanan,32' the defendant was accused of
315. Specht v. Jensen, 853 F.2d 805 (1988) (en banc), rev'g in part 832 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.
1987).
316. Id. at 808.
317. Id. at 809 (citing Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 512 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); see supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 809-10.
320. Id. at 809 (citing United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 483 (10th Cir. 1986)
(Expert was permitted to testify that certain weapons fit the statutory description of weapons
required to be registered with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms.); see infra notes
321-27 and accompanying text).
321. 787 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1986).
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manufacturing and possessing an unregistered firearm.322 An expert
witness, an agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms,
was asked whether the device in question was of the type that was
required to be registered with the Department of Treasury.3 23 He
answered, "Yes. ' 324 The defendant objected that the testimony was
an improper legal conclusion. 325 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed admission of the testimony, pointing
out that "[t]he question before the jury involved the consideration of a
particular homemade device against an array of statutory definitions.
Under such circumstances, the courts have admitted this sort of testi-
mony. 3 26  The array of definitions to which the court referred
included four interlocking subsections of statute in which a number of
terms were defined by cross-references. 27
One might imagine numerous situations in which the statutes are
so complex that an expert witness could play a useful role in helping
the jury apply them to the evidence. Two obvious areas are cases
involving securities laws and cases involving the Internal Revenue
Code. In Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc. ,328 for example, the expert
witness was attempting not only to state opinions of law, but also to
interpret the conduct and obligations of the parties in the context of a
complex regulatory environment.329In Adalman v. Baker, Watts &
Co. ,33o the expert witness was attempting to apply complex statutes to
complex fact patterns. 3  1  The Siamese-twin stumbling blocks of
"legal conclusion stated by a witness" and "conclusion based on inad-
equately explored legal criteria" prevent juries from receiving expert
testimony that might provide great assistance in cases of this type.
In tax cases, expert witnesses are permitted to state their sum-
322. Id. at 479. The unregistered "firearm" was a plastic milk jug filled with gasoline and
charcoal lighter fluid and sealed with a rag fuse. This firebomb was used to burn a house
trailer. The government charged that manufacture and possession of the device violated the
National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), (f) (1982). Buchanan, 787 F.2d at 479.
323. Buchanan, 787 F.2d at 483.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing United States v. McCauley, 601 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir.
1979) (per curiam), and Bryan v. United States, 373 F.2d 403, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1967)). In a
footnote, the court also cited seven cases in which expert witnesses had testified as to statutory
classification of firearms, but in which the propriety of such testimony had not been addressed
on appeal. Id. at 483 n.7.
327. Id. at 483 n.6.
328. 550 F.2d 505, 509 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g in part 400 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); see supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
329. Marx, 550 F.2d at 508-12.
330. 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); see supra note 223.
331. Adalman, 807 F.2d at 361-62, 365.
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mary conclusions about the meaning of defendants' transactions.332
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently
may have inched over the line between allowing expert witnesses to
interpret facts and allowing expert witnesses to apply the tax laws to
those factual interpretations. In United States v. Barnette,333 an Inter-
nal Revenue Service agent gave his opinion of the "income tax impli-
cations" of evidence presented in the case against defendants accused
of defrauding the government in connection with a government con-
tract.334  The court held that such expert testimony is "clearly
permissible. '335
D. Exclusion of Testimony Under Rule 704(b)
The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984336 amended Rule
704.337 The original text of the rule became subdivision (a) and a new
subdivision (b) was added:338
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the
mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime
charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters
for the trier of fact alone.339
The legislative history makes it clear that Congress recognized
the insanity defense as one particular area in which expert witnesses
were routinely called upon by the courts to express opinions on ulti-
mate issues in terms of legal criteria:
The purpose of this amendment is to eliminate the confusing
332. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943); United States v. Schafer, 580 F.2d
774 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). For a discussion of Johnson, see supra notes
136-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Schafer, see supra notes 184-85 and
accompanying text.
333. 800 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1578 (1987).
334. Id. at 1568.
335. Id. (citing United States v. Schafer, 580 F.2d at 744). For a discussion of Schafer, see
supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text). Arguably, the expert witness in Schafer also gave
a mixed opinion of fact and law, in that his summary of the evidence against defendant
included a computation of defendant's taxes, employing the net worth approach. 580 F.2d at
778. The Schafer court focused more on the expert's role in compiling and organizing the
factual evidence against the defendant, whereas in Barnette, the phrase "income tax
implications" strongly suggests a conclusion based on application of the legal standards to the
facts of the case.
336. Pub. L. No. 98-473, title II, §§ 401-406, 98 Stat. 2057 (1984).
337. Id. § 406, 98 Stat. at 2067-68.
338. M. GRAHAM, supra note 130, note on subsequent enactment of Rule 704(b), at 182
(Supp. 1985). The original text of Rule 704 also was slightly modified by adding the
introductory limiting reference, "Except as provided in subdivision (b)." Id. at 181-82.
339. FED. R. EvID. 704(b).
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spectacle of competing expert witnesses testifying to directly con-
tradictory conclusions as to the ultimate legal issue to be found by
the trier of fact. Under this proposal, expert psychiatric testimony
would be limited to presenting and explaining their diagnoses, such
as whether the defendant had a severe mental disease or defect and
what the characteristics of such a disease or defect, if any, may
have been. 4°
Other than cases that have unsuccessfully challenged the Rule's
constitutionality,341 cases citing to Rule 704(b) generally determine
whether the proffered testimony reaches the ultimate legal conclusion
as to the defendant's mental state. In United States v. Edwards,342 for
example, the defendant, Edwards, pleaded not guilty by reason of
insanity to a charge of unarmed bank robbery.343 A psychiatrist
called by the defense testified that the defendant was "off the wall"
and that the doctor had a "very, very strong suspicion" that the
defendant had suffered from "manic-depressive" illness at the time of
the robbery. 3" In rebuttal, the government's psychiatrist concluded
that the defendant "was not in 'an active manic state' at the time of
the robbery because Edwards' actions were reasonably well controlled
and goal directed. ' 345 The government's psychiatrist further testified
that the defendant would have been depressed and frustrated by ongo-
ing financial problems and that under the circumstances, his "frantic"
decision to rob a bank was "understandable. '346  The defendant
objected that this testimony was improper under Rule 704(b) because
it contained the psychiatrist's opinion concerning his legal sanity. 47
The trial court admitted the testimony into evidence and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that the rule was not aimed at statements of this type:
Congress did not enact Rule 704(b) so as to limit the flow of
diagnostic and clinical information. Every actual fact concerning
the defendant's mental condition is still as admissible after the
enactment of Rule 704(b) as it was before .... The ultimate legal
issue at Edwards' trial was whether Edwards "lack[ed] substantial
capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of law." In fact, the chal-
340. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 230, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 3182, 3412 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 225].
341. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 805 F.2d 1458, 1462-64 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
342. 819 F.2d 262 (11th Cir. 1987).
343. Id. at 263.
344. Id. at 264.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
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lenged statements offer no conclusions at all about Edwards. Doc-
tor Jaslow [the government's witness] was simply observing that
people who are not insane can nevertheless become frantic over a
financial crisis .... Using a common sense generalization, Doctor
Jaslow explained why the defendant's behavior.., did not neces-
sarily indicate an active manic state. We think that the doctor
played exactly the kind of role which Congress contemplated for
348the expert witness ....
Edwards suggests that the courts will continue to follow a long-
standing practice of liberally admitting psychiatric testimony,349
drawing a narrow line that excludes only testimony using the words
of the applicable legal standard, but little else. This appears to be in
keeping with legislative intent:
Psychiatrists, of course, must be permitted to testify fully
about the defendant's diagnosis, mental state and motivation (in
clinical and -commonsense terms) at the time of the alleged act so
as to permit the jury or judge to reach the ultimate conclusion
about which they and only they are expert.35 °
As intended by Congress, Rule 704(b) does not apply only to
expert testimony on the issue of insanity.35' The general language of
the Rule refers to any "mental state or condition constituting an ele-
ment of the crime charged or a defense thereto. ' 352 Thus, in United
348. Id. at 265 (citations omitted) (quoting Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908, 916 (5th
Cir. 1969) (en banc), modified sub nom. United States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 930 (1984)). The common law standard for the insanity -defense, quoted
above, has been .replaced by the statutory standard set forth in the Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, title II, § 402(a), 98 Stat. 2057 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 17
(Supp. IV 1986)). Edwards, 819 F.2d at 265 n.3. The Act provides that a defendant must
prove he "was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts" in
order to assert the affirmative defense of insanity. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a)-(b). Although the
statutory standard was in effect at the time of Edwards' trial, it was not applied in that case
because the robbery occurred before the effective date of the Act. Edwards, 819 F.2d at 265
n.3. The Fifth Circuit's Blake formulation of the common law insanity defense standard, used
in the Edwards trial, was also replaced by a new common law standard in 1984. In United
States v. Lyons, 731 F.2d at 248, the Fifth Circuit held that "a person is not responsible for
criminal conduct on the grounds of insanity only if at the time of that conduct, as a result of a
mental disease or defect, he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of that conduct." Id.
Lyons was decided on April 16, 1984. Id. at 243. The Insanity Defense Reform Act was
enacted on October 12, 1984. 98 Stat. at 2057. The 1984 Lyons court did not refer to the
Insanity Defense Reform Act, which had not yet been enacted at that time. The 1987 Edwards
court did not mention the superseded Lyons modification of the Blake common law standard.
349. "All evidence relevant or pertinent to the issue of insanity should be admitted. This is
in keeping with the philosophy of letting in all facts which might be helpful to the jury in
making the final determination of the criminal responsibility of the accused." United States v.
Alexander, 805 F.2d at 1464 (citation omitted).
350. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 340, at 231.
351. Id.
352. FED. R. EvID. 704(b).
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States v. Dotson,35 3 the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court
erred in allowing an internal revenue agent to specify items of the
defendant's conduct that indicated an "intent willfully to evade
income taxes." '354 Affirming, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found that the testimony was very close to stating a
forbidden conclusion that the defendant had "willfully and intention-
ally" evaded income taxes.355 But, the court said, a more reasonable
interpretation was that the witness had not stated a conclusion as to
the defendant's state of mind but only that the facts indicated that
such a conclusion could be drawn.356 Similarly, in United States v.
Brown,3 57 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
was moved to comment that an expert's characterization of defendant
as a "steerer" in a drug transaction came dangerously close to, with-
out quite violating, the prohibition of Rule 704(b).358
Beyond the problems of defining the exact scope of the Rule, a
process that the courts are just beginning to explore,359 Rule 704(b) is
interesting for what it implies about congressional interpretation of
the ultimate issue rule. The doctrine of the negative pregnant holds
that by asserting a negative, one may also imply an affirmative. 360 If it
is necessary for Congress to legislate that expert witnesses may not
testify to a mixed conclusion of law and fact in a narrowly defined
area of inquiry, then may courts infer that it is not per se impermissi-
ble for experts to state such conclusions in other areas? Thus, Rule
704(b) may provide the grounds for a future ruling that the abolition
of the ultimate issue rule under Rule 704(a) extends as well to opin-
ions in which witnesses apply legal criteria to the facts of the case.361
IV. TOWARD A UNIFIED THEORY OF EXCLUSION
A. Theory of the Final Leap
It is difficult to arrive at a single theory to explain the admission
or exclusion of expert testimony. The cases decided under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence regime do not fall into a clearly articulated and
353. 817 F.2d 1127, modified on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1034 (5th Cir. 1987).
354. Id. at 1131-32.
355. Id. at 1132.
356. Id.
357. 776 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141 (1986); see supra text
accompanying notes 191-93.
358. Brown, 776 F.2d at 401.
359. As of August 25, 1988, only thirty-six reported federal cases had cited to Rule 704(b).
360. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 930 (5th ed. 1979).
361. This argument stops short, however, of overcoming the objection to conclusions based
on inadequately explored legal criteria. See infra Section V.
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easily organized body of law. The courts have applied the rules in an
uneven and often unpredictable manner. Compare, for example, the
way that the courts of appeals in three different circuits have resolved
the question: Was the defendant's product or procedure "unreasona-
bly dangerous?" 362
In Karns v. Emerson Electric Co. ,363 a portable weed trimming
device with a circular saw blade attachment, which was being used to
clear overgrown brush as the manufacturer intended, "kicked back"
without warning and severed the plaintiff's right arm above the
elbow. 3" At trial, the plaintiff's expert witness testified that the prod-
uct was "unreasonably dangerous beyond the expectation of the aver-
age user" and that the manufacturer "acted recklessly" in producing
and distributing it.365 In overruling the manufacturer's objection, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found:
[T]he facts were of a sufficiently technical nature that expert testi-
mony could be expected to assist the jury in deciding the case. In
both instances, [the expert] explained the bases for his opinions in
sufficient detail to permit the jury to independently evaluate his
conclusions. The legal terms used are not so complex or shaded
with subtle meaning as to be beyond the understanding of the aver-
age person, and [the expert's] use of those terms did not conflict
with the court's instructions.366
Thus, a witness was permitted to state an essentially commonsense
conclusion based on inadequately explored legal criteria because the
362. The phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is often used in jurisdictions that have adopted
the product liability standard of the Second Restatement of Torts: One who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property .... RESIATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). The official comments
attempt to flesh out the meaning of the term:
The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be
contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is
not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and
is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous
amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous.
Id. comment i.
363. 817 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1987).
364. Id. at 1454.
365. Id. at 1459. Karns was tried under Oklahoma's common law action for strict liability
based on the Restatement standard. Id. at 1455.
366, Id. (citations omitted). The Tenth Circuit panel that decided Specht v. Jensen cited
Karns to support its holding that the witness had not improperly instructed the jury on the
applicable law. Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516, 1527 (1987), rev'd in part, 853 F.2d 805 (10th
Cir. 1988) (en banc); see supra notes 301-20 and accompanying text. The Karns holding was
ignored, however, by the full court sitting en banc when it reversed the panel's decision.
Specht, 853 F.2d at 808-10.
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subject matter was technical and the legal terms, though not
explained, were easily understood.
In contrast stands Strong v. E.I DuPont de Nemours Co.,367 a
case in which a construction supervisor for a natural gas company
was killed by a gas explosion that resulted when a plastic gas pipe
separated from a connector.368 The supervisor's widow sued the pipe
manufacturer under theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach
of warranty.3 69 The trial court excluded expert testimony that would
have concluded that the defendant had provided inadequate instruc-
tions and warnings regarding safe installation of the pipe, making the
product "unreasonably dangerous."37 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the exclusion on two grounds:
First, that the conclusion was based on inadequately explored legal
criteria, and second, that the matter was "not the kind of issue on
which expert assistance is essential for the trier of fact. The jury was
capable of drawing its own inferences from the available evidence."37'
The Strong court's reasoning was opposite to the reasoning used
by the Karns court, and not surprisingly, it reached the opposite con-
clusion: Although the subject matter of the proffered testimony was
technical in nature, the conclusion it contained was a matter of com-
mon sense; therefore, the witness could not state his opinion.372 Fur-
thermore, inadequately explored legal criteria that could be
understood easily by the Karns jury formed the basis for exclusion in
Strong.
Finally, consider Matthews v. Ashland Chemical, Inc. ,373 a case in
which a propane gas deliveryman was burned in a flash fire on the
defendant's premises. 374 The accident occurred when a spark from a
367. 667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981).
368. Id. at 683.
369. Id. The case report does not state the legal standard for strict liability in Nebraska.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska adopted the strict liability cause of action for defective
products that cause personal injury to persons in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb. 428,
436, 191 N.W.2d 601, 606 (1971). In that case, the court cited with approval section 402A of
the Second Restatement of Torts. Id. at 435, 191 N.W. 2d at 606. The court adopted the
Restatement's standard for strict liability more explicitly and first used the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous" in McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 196-99,
241 N.W.2d 822, 826-27 (1976). The court provided a judicial definition of "unreasonably
dangerous" in Hancock v. Paccar, Inc., 204 Neb. 468, 483-84, 283 N.W.2d 25, 37 (1979). In
view of these cases, it is almost certain that the Strong trial court applied the standard of
section 402A of the Restatement as adopted by Nebraska.
370. Strong, 667 F.2d at 685.
371. Id. at 686.
372. Id.
373. 770 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985).
374. Id. at 1305.
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water cooler ignited propane gas that had escaped from a hose that
the plaintiff was using to fill the defendant's tank. The plaintiff
argued on appeal that the trial court erred in not permitting his expert
witness to express an opinion as to whether the defendant had created
an environment that was "ultrahazardous" or "unreasonably danger-
ous" by storing the tanks to be refilled too close to an electrical
device.375 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the district court, stating:
"Rule 704... does not open the door to all opinions. The Advi-
sory Committee notes make it clear that questions which would
merely allow the witness to tell the jury what result to reach are
not permitted. Nor is the rule intended to allow a witness to give
legal conclusions." This is what [the witness] was attempting.3 76
The witness could not apply the "unreasonably dangerous" criterion,
the appellate court found, because he would have been answering an
all-inclusive question, spanning the entire range of testimony, to reach
the ultimate jury question.377
The variable that may explain the apparent irreconcilability of
Karns with Strong and Matthews is the judge's confidence in the jury,
a factor that might be called the theory of the "final leap." In each
case, the judge has implicitly expressed an opinion about the jury's
ability to pick up the pieces of the evidence at whatever stage they are
left by the expert witness and independently evaluate that evidence to
arrive at an ultimate conclusion. There are risks on both sides of the
decision. If the expert stops too far short of the ultimate conclusion,
the jury may not have received enough assistance to make the final
leap intelligently. If the expert goes too far, the jury may be tempted
to invest too much of its decision in the credibility of the expert and
375. Id. at 1311. Note that the use of the term "unreasonably dangerous" in this case did
not have precisely the same meaning as in the two previous examples because the action was
not based on common law product liability under the approach of the Second Restatement of
Torts but on statutory strict liability under the LouisiAna Civil Code. Id. at 1306 (citing LA.
CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 2317 & 2322 (West 1979)). In an earlier opinion in the same case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the statute requires a plaintiff to
prove that "the harm he suffered resulted from an unreasonable risk created by the defendant's
conduct or equipment." Id. (citing Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 703 F.2d 921, 924 (5th
Cir. 1983) (which quoted Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1149 (La. 1983))). The question
of "unreasonable risk" can go to the jury only if the trial judge has first determined that "the
risk and the gravity of the harm created are of such magnitude that they outweigh the social
utility of the defendant's conduct." Id. Apparently, the trial court equated the use of the
phrase "ultrahazardous or unreasonably dangerous" in the question asked by plaintiff's
attorney with the phrase "unreasonable risk" used in the appellate court's earlier opinion.
376. Id. at 1311 (quoting Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)).
For a discussion of Owen, see supra notes 280-93.
377. Matthews, 770 F.2d at 1311; see infra note 378.
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verdicts may reflect nothing more than the personal credibility of the
experts produced by opposing parties.
Examined in this light, the three "unreasonably dangerous" cases
appear to deal more with the second risk than the first.378 The Karns
378. The inquiry as to whether a product is "in a defective condition [and] unreasonably
dangerous," under the standard of section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, may take
on varying degrees of complexity and require different levels of analysis in weighing the first
risk, the risk of providing the jury with inadequate assistance. In Karns, the product injured
the plaintiff when it behaved in an unexpected way during ordinary use. 817 F.2d at 1454.
The jury was faced with a relatively simple standard: Whether, taking into account the
product's characteristics and the instructions and warnings provided with the product, the
product was dangerous beyond the expectation of the ordinary consumer. Id. at 1455. This
does not appear to be the kind of question for which the jury would require expert assistance.
Who would be better than the jury to gauge the expectations of the ordinary consumer? If ever
there were a "common sense" legal standard, this is it. The court commented that "the most
that can be said is that the testimony defendant challenges was not helpful to the jury in
deciding the case, since the expert was, in effect, merely telling the jury what result to reach."
Id. at 1459. But the court did not state that the witness' opinion was not helpful to the jury.
In allowing the testimony as being within the trial court's discretion, the court implied that the
testimony could have been helpful.
Strong involved a very similar situation. The plaintiff alleged that the plastic natural gas
line became unreasonably dangerous when her husband used it improperly due to the
manufacturer's failure to provide adequate instructions and warnings to ensure that it would
be installed safely. Strong, 667 F.2d at 684. There was no issue as to the technical performance
of the pipe or how it should have been installed. All parties apparently agreed that a different
method should have been used to connect the pipe. Id. at 684-85. The jury was required only
to determine whether the manufacturer's instructions and warnings were adequate. Id. at 684-
85. In this case, the Eighth Circuit ruled explicitly that the first risk was not present-that the
jury did not need the expert's assistance. Id. at 686.
In Matthews, however, the issue was somewhat more complex. Under the legal standard,
the jury was required to weigh the risk of harm against the social utility of the defendant's
procedure, the storage of empty propane gas tanks near a water cooler. Matthews, 770 F.2d at
1306. Several factors might come into play in determining social utility, and an expert's
opinion is more likely to be useful in suggesting how the factors might be weighed and
balanced against one another. Indeed, the Matthews court did not explicitly rule out such
testimony. The holding dealt specifically with the breadth of the question asked of the witness:
"[W]hat happened on May 16th, 1979, and what [were] the origin and the cause of the
fire... ?" Id. at 1311. The ruling implicitly leaves open the possibility that the court would
have permitted a more focused question that would have enabled the witness to express an
opinion as to whether the procedure was unreasonably dangerous. Id. This appears to be a
case in which the first risk could have been taken into account if the plaintiff's counsel had
asked the appropriate question.
In some product liability cases, courts have required a risk-benefit analysis to determine
whether a product is "dangerously defective." In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d
413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443 (1978), the Supreme Court of California listed five
factors commonly weighed by California juries in the determination: "[T]he gravity of the
danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the
mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design,
and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from an
alternative design." Id. at 431, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237, 573 P.2d at 455. In such a case, there
would be a much greater risk that the jury could not apply the legal standard correctly without
expert assistance and much greater justification for allowing expert testimony incorporating
the legal standard than in simpler cases like Karns and Strong.
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court expressed confidence that even if the witness were telling the
jury something it could figure out for itself, the jury would still make
the determination independently. The Strong and Matthews courts,
on the other hand, appear to have been more worried that the witness
would dominate the jury's decision. 379 According to one commenta-
tor, the court's approach depends upon the judge's confidence in the
jury's ability to weigh the testimony and use it appropriately:
The greater a judge's trust in juries, the more relaxed and more
permissive will be her application of rules restricting admissibility
of opinion testimony. Conversely, a judge who lacks confidence in
a jury's ability to distinguish a weak or fallacious argument from a
sound and persuasive one will tend to impose more stringent
requirements on opinion testimony, will more severely restrict the
witness' manner of testifying, and will more freely grant motions to
strike, all in an effort to control the flow of information upon
which the jury may rest its final determination.38 0
Conversely, there are cases in which the risk of inadequate assist-
ance to the jury appears to dominate the court's thinking, cases in
which the fact pattern or the legal criteria to be applied are so com-
plex that the judge is not fully confident of the jury's ability to make
the final leap without expert assistance. This category includes cases
like In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,38' which
dealt with sophisticated economic theory and antitrust law; Vucinich
v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. ,382 dealing with securities
sales transactions; and United States v. Lueben,383 a case that dealt
with commercial real estate loan transactions. Also included in this
category are United States v. Schafer384 and United States v. Fogg,385
cases dealing with federal income tax liability; and the panel decision
in Specht v. Jensen,386 which was concerned with subtle distinctions in
379. Note the contrast between Karns, in which the witness explained why he reached his
conclusion, 817 F.2d at 1459, and Matthews, in which the witness was asked simply to state a
conclusion based on all the facts in evidence, 770 F.2d at 1311.
380. Pratt, supra note 11, at 331.
381. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), revg in part Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981), incorporat'g by reference 505 F. Supp. 1313
(E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); see supra notes 73-84 & 160-64 and accompanying text.
382. 803 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 165-72 & 225-29 and accompanying text.
383. 812 F.2d 179, vacated in part on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1987); see
supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
384. 580 F.2d 774 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); see supra notes 184-85 and
accompanying text.
385. 652 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982); see supra notes
266-69 and accompanying text.
386. 832 F.2d 1516 (1987), rev'd in part, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see supra
notes 301-20 and accompanying text.
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search and seizure law.
In many other cases, the line is not so clearly drawn. The subject
matter may be such that the jury is likely to know something about it
and have a reasonable basis in personal experience to draw a conclu-
sion, but the expert can provide useful insights beyond the ordinary.
At other times, the expert's opinion may be useful but difficult to
express in words other than the words of the legal standard. In such
cases, the courts weigh the jury's ability to make the final leap against
the perceived danger of overvaluing the expert's opinion. When there
is no compelling argument to be made on either side, the testimony is
almost always admitted.
This process of judicial weighing is strikingly similar to the anal-
ysis inherent in Rule 403.387 If the theory of the final leap is used as
the criterion for judging the probative value of the evidence, and if the
danger of misleading the jury by virtue of overvaluation is seen as the
primary risk, then it becomes apparent that the courts may be falling
back on one of the most basic tests in the Federal Rules of Evidence
to decide the difficult expert opinion cases. This should hardly come
as a surprise. As mentioned previously, the advisory committee's
note to Rule 704 refers to Rule 403 as one of the bases for limiting the
otherwise sweeping scope of the Rule 704 abolition of the ultimate
issue rule.388
It should be noted in closing that Rule 704(b) is a special case of
the theory of the final leap. Congress has decided that the jury will
decide on its own whether the criminal defendant's mental state, as
described by expert witnesses, met the legally defined criteria. Expert
witnesses may not express an opinion on this ultimate issue. Congress
apparently believed that expert witnesses have no expertise that will
enable them to make this final leap with greater than ordinary insight
or understanding. 38 9 Because such testimony will not assist the jury,
387. Rule 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. FED. R. EvID. 403.
388. See supra note 155 and accompanying text. The advisory committee's note to Rule
704 suggests that Rule 403 be used to exclude testimony that wastes time. FED. R. EvID. 704
advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1973). It does not explicitly deal with the
overvaluation issue. Weinstein commented: "Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to
exclude statements of opinion whose probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks of
prejudice, confusion or waste of time. . . . Rarely, therefore, will 'any case be decided by
reference to Rule 704." J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10, § 704[02], at 704-12 to -13.
389. The Senate Report on the amendment of Rule 704 quotes with approval a statement by
the American Psychiatric Association that implies that psychiatrists are no better qualified
than lay jurors to reach the ultimate conclusion as to legal sanity:
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it is not admissible.39 ° In other words, Congress believed that juries
are capable of making the final leap on their own without expert gui-
dance. The legislative history of Rule 704(b) also suggests the con-
cern that experts tend to overwhelm and confuse the jury when
testifying on the issue of the defendant's mental state.391
B. Source of the Legal Standard
Courts also seem to be asking who sets the standard to which an
expert witness will, testify. If the standard is provided by the law,
rather than by a source outside of the legal rulemaking process, there
appears to be a greater reluctance to let the witness make the final
leap.
In medical malpractice cases, for example, a physician ordinarily
cannot be found negligent unless an expert witness testifies that he has
violated the standards of proper medical practice in his community.392
The expert may not be permitted to tell the jury, using the words of
the law, that the defendant physician was negligent, as in Haney v.
Mizell Memorial Hospital,393 but his testimony that the defendant
breached the standards of the profession has virtually the same opera-
tive effect.
The cumulative effect of [the common law rules relating to
medical malpractice] has meant that the standard of conduct
becomes one of "good medical practice," which is to say, what is
customary and usual in the profession.
It has been pointed out often enough that this gives the medi-
cal profession, and also the [other professions], the privilege, which
It is clear that psychiatrists are experts in medicine, not the law. As such, it
is clear that the psychiatrist's first obligation and expertise in the courtroom is to
"do psychiatry," i.e., to present medical information and opinion about the
defendant's mental state and motivation and to explain in detail the reason for
his medical-psychiatric conclusions. When, however, "ultimate issue" questions
are formulated by the law and put to the expert witness who must then say "yea"
or "nay," then the expert witness is required to make a leap in logic. He no
longer addresses himself to medical concepts but instead must infer or intuit
what is in fact unspeakable, namely, the probable relationship between medical
concepts and legal or moral constructs such as free will.
S. REP. No. 225, supra note 340, at 231.
390. FED. R. EvID. 702.
391. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
392. W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 188 (5th ed.
1984). The one common exception to the rule requiring expert testimony as a condition
precedent to finding medical malpractice is the case in which the wrongful nature of the
conduct at issue is thought to be within the common knowledge of laymen, as when a surgeon
amputates the wrong leg. In such cases, the jury is often permitted to infer negligence without
the testimony of an expert. Id. at 189.
393. 744 F.2d 1467, 1473-75 (1lth Cir. 1984); see supra note 300.
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is usually emphatically denied to other groups, of setting their own
legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own practices.
It is sometimes said that this is because the physician has impliedly
represented that he will follow customary methods, and so has
undertaken to do so. Another explanation, perhaps more valid, is
the healthy respect which the courts have had for the learning of a
fellow profession, and their reluctance to overburden it with liabil-
ity based on uneducated judgment.3 94
Thus, assuming that in a given case there is no dispute as to the
facts but only as to whether the defendant physician's acknowledged
conduct was negligent under the circumstances, if the plaintiff's
experts testify that the defendant's actions violated the standards of
the profession and if defendant's experts testify that they did not, then
the opposing experts are actually debating what the jury should con-
sider to be the appropriate standard. They are testifying, in effect, as
to what should be the law of the case. The court will instruct the jury
that it must decide whether the relevant standard was breached. How
can the jury decide this question without concluding that one set of
experts presented a more credible standard than the other set of
experts?
Similarly, in United States v. Jensen3 95 and Vucinich v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. ,396 in which the issue was the applica-
tion of standards set within an industry, the courts were willing to let
the witnesses interpret those standards to the juries, despite the fact
that the standards might ultimately rise to the level of legal enforce-
ment.39 7 On the other hand, Marx & Co. v. Diners' Club, Inc. 398 and
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co. 399 represent the court's belief that if
the standard is set by law, only the jury may make the final leap from
factual determination to legal application.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The most consistently applied rule of expert testimony is the rule
394. W. KEETON, supra note 392, § 32, at 189 (footnotes omitted).
395. 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
396. 803 F.2d 454 (9th Cir. 1986); see supra notes 165-72 & 225-29 and accompanying text.
397. Accord Phillips Oil Co. v. OKC Cgrp., 812 F.2d 265, 279 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 152 (1987) (Witnesses were permitted to testify to meanings of accounting terms used in
contract between parties in light of specialized usage of the oil and gas industry.); Fund of
Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp. 1314, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (A witness
was permitted to testify to the propriety of defendant's actions pursuant to generally accepted
auditing standards.).
398. 550 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'g in part 400 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 861 (1977); see supra notes 211-23 and accompanying text.
399. 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); see supra note 223.
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of judicial discretion. As appellate courts uniformly observe, the trial
judge is in the best position to determine whether an expert's opinion
will assist the jury.4° The judge's ruling will be reversed only for
abuse of discretion, which is found to occur in relatively few cases." 1
Furthermore, article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence is
essentially inclusive, not exclusive, in its intent.402 Consequently, the
most common pattern of federal court disposition in the kind of case
at issue is the trial judge's decision to admit challenged expert opin-
ions into evidence, followed by affirmance on appeal.
On the most explicit level, it is apparent that judges try to apply
Rules 702 and 704, both in letter and in spirit. It is also apparent that
the judges are motivated by the same concerns that found expression
in the displaced common law rules. Judges still do not want witnesses
to tell the jury what it already knows, to make statements that cannot
be supported by the current state of scientific knowledge, to state
broad conclusions without providing any supporting information to
help the jury make up its own mind, or to state conclusions in terms
of legal standards that may not be understood by the jury. All of
these judicial concerns can be supported by reference to specific provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
On a more intuitive level, judges appear to balance the perceived
ability of the jury to reach an ultimate conclusion of fact or of mixed
law and fact, the "final leap," against the risk that expert testimony
going to the ultimate issue will be overvalued by the jury, and thus do
more harm than good. Judges also appear to be more willing to allow
the witness to make the final leap if the standards against which facts
will be measured have been developed by authorities other than courts
or legislatures. 4 3
At present, there appear to be two principal sources of unpredict-
ability in the decision whether to admit expert testimony. The nar-
rower problem is the possible exclusion of expert testimony because it
is phrased in terms of "inadequately explored legal criteria." One
position, represented by Owen v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,' is that an
expert witness should never state a conclusion based on his own appli-
400. E.g., Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 685-86 (8th Cir. 1981).
401. E.g., id. at 685.
402. See M. GRAHAM, supra note 130, § 701.0, at 604; J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 10,
§ 702[02], at 702-14 to -15; Pratt, supra note 11, at 316-17.
403. In other words, testimony in which the expert witness evaluates facts and opinions
against industry or professional standards of conduct is more likely to be admitted into
evidence than testimony in which the expert witness evaluates facts and opinions against legal
standards of conduct.
404. 698 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1983); see supra notes 280-93 and accompanying text.
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cation of legal criteria to a factual situation. The other position, rep-
resented by the panel decision in Specht v. Jensen 405 and the implied
logic of Davis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc.," is that a witness
should be able to state mixed conclusions of fact and law if it is
demonstrated that he is familiar with the applicable legal criteria.
It is submitted, however, that both positions are incorrect and
miss the point of Rule 704. The mere fact that a witness is shown to
be familiar with, or is considered an expert in, a given field of law is
not a sufficient reason to permit him to state his interpretation of the
appropriate legal criteria to apply to the given fact situation. Without
dispute, stating the law to the jury is the function of the judge. But
Rule 704 contemplates that an expert witness should be able to state
an opinion on any relevant issue, including the very issue that the jury
will be asked to decide, assuming that his opinion will assist the jury
and need not be excluded for Rule. 403 concerns. 4 7
The dual goals of allowing the witness his full testimonial range
and avoiding confusion in the statement of the law are not mutually
exclusive. In fact, these two concerns are easily harmonized. The
judge need only instruct the witness and the jury in the applicable law
before the witness answers a question in which legal criteria are to be
applied. This simple device will ensure that all participants-judge,
jurors, witness and parties-have a common understanding of the
principles of law that will govern both the opinion of the witness and
the decision of the jury, and it will do no violence to the proper per-
formance of any participant's role in the trial. In any jury trial, the
judge instructs the jury on the legal criteria to be applied just before it
begins its deliberations. There is no compelling reason why the judge
should not also provide such a statement at an earlier appropriate
time. It is conceded that the trial may be delayed while opposing
counsel argue about what that legal standard should be, but this exer-
cise will occur at some point in the proceedings regardless. No addi-
tional time will be consumed by conducting the debate earlier.
If the judge were to instruct expert witnesses on the applicable
law, much as he later instructs the jury, there would be no basis for
concern about inadequately explored legal criteria, the expert compet-
ing with the judge as the authority on the law, or the expert stating a
conclusion based on an incorrect perception of applicable law. Fur-
ther, the court would be relieved of drawing difficult distinctions
405. 832 F.2d 1516 (1987), rev'd in part, 853 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1988) (en banc); see supra
notes 301-20 and accompanying text.
406. 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984); see supra notes 294-300 and accompanying text.
407. See supra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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between permissible conclusions of fact and impermissible conclu-
sions of mixed fact and law. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the purpose of Rule 704 would be better served because the jury
would receive the full benefit of the expert's opinion on the question at
issue.
The traditional counterargument to the above suggestion is that
the jury does not need the expert's assistance in applying the facts to
the law, particularly after the expert has already gone to the very
threshold of the fact/law conclusion by stating his opinion on the
issue of ultimate fact. At that point, the jury should be quite capable
of taking the last step on its own.
But this assertion does not stand up either as a matter of policy
or in practice. On the policy level, there is nothing in the Federal
Rules of Evidence to suggest that the jury should be walked only to
the front doorstep of a party's proposed conclusion but not escorted
inside. Any concern that the witness will in some way usurp the
province of the jury ignores the policy decision inherent in Rule 704
that the jury will function best if adversaries on all sides of the contro-
versy are allowed to make a full presentation. The Rule relies on the
ability of opposing parties to present experts with opposing views, and
on cross-examination to challenge the conclusions offered by expert
witnesses, to give the jury an opportunity to consider all possible con-
clusions. The judge routinely instructs the jury that it should give no
special deference to the opinions of experts and that it is free to decide
the issues as it sees fit.
On the practical level, the foregoing discussion has identified sev-
eral categories of cases in which it might be very useful for the witness
to state mixed conclusions of fact and law, particularly cases involv-
ing complex economic and financial concepts. Furthermore, there is
no good reason to allow a witness to state a conclusion that applies
facts to a privately developed standard, but to prohibit the witness
from applying facts to a judicial or legislative standard. The securities
expert who testifies that a limited partnership's offering prospectus
violated Securities and Exchange Commission rules is no more forc-
ing the jury's conclusion than the doctor who opines that another
doctor violated the standards of medical practice in his community.
Given the technical nature of the standards and the fine discrimina-
tions that must be made in both situations, the securities expert's testi-
mony is as helpful to the jury as the doctor's testimony. The mere
fact that one is applying public regulations and the other private regu-
lations is of no significance if both standards will be given the force of
law by the court.
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The second source of unpredictability in rulings on challenges to
admission of expert testimony is the tension inherent in the process of
weighing the jury's need for assistance against the risk that the jury
will overvalue the expert's opinion in making the final leap. To the
extent that it is truly a factor in judicial decisionmaking, this element
of uncertainty should be eliminated entirely. A decision to disallow
testimony based on mistrust of the jury's ability to evaluate witnesses
is a throwback to the discredited rule against "usurping the province
of the jury," and it finds no support in the text or underlying policies
of article VII.
Although countless commentators and judges have decried the
tendency of trials to become "battles of the experts," leaving the jury
with little more to do than decide which side's experts it prefers, a
superior alternative has not yet evolved. Rule 704's abolition of the
ultimate issue rule was predicated on the belief that juries have the
ability to comprehend and evaluate the reasoning and conclusions
presented to them by experts.
The adversary, system should ensure that experts cannot get away
with "merely tell[ing] the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the
manner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day."" 8 If the proponent of
an expert's opinion is remiss in bringing out the bases of the stated
conclusions, the opponent should be quick to explore weaknesses or
gaps in the presentation on cross-examination.
Elimination of the overvaluation variable in the weighing process
leaves only one question for the judge in most of the examined cases:
Can the jury make the final leap from fact to opinion without the
expert's opinion as well as it could with it? At its root, therefore, the
theory of the final leap is nothing more than a restatement of the
essence of Rule 702: Expert testimony should be admitted if it will
assist the trier of fact. Applied properly, Rule 704(a) is simply a gloss
on Rule 702.
Rule 704(b) demonstrates that there is at least one situation in
which public policy dictates that the jury alone must make the final
leap. Experience may reveal other such situations. If so, they, like
the "mental state or condition" standard of Rule 704(b) should be
codified as exceptions to the general rule of admissibility.
Adoption of these suggestions could be accomplished most sim-
ply by redrafting the fourth paragraph of the advisory committee's
note to Rule 704. The current text of the paragraph states:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars
408. FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1973).
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so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions
must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for
exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions afford
ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would
merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner
of the oath-helpers of an earlier day. They also stand ready to
exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal
criteria. Thus the question, "Did T have capacity to make a will?"
would be excluded, while the question, "Did T have sufficient
mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property and
the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational
scheme of distribution?" would be allowed. McCormick § 12."
In the suggested redraft, the following words would be deleted:
"afford ample assurances against the admission of opinions which
would merely tell the jury what result to reach, somewhat in the man-
ner of the oath-helpers of an earlier day. They." Also, the words,
"would be excluded" would be replaced by the words, "could be
excluded within the range of discretion allowed to the court."
Finally, the suggested redraft would include new text explaining the
circumstances in which an expert witness should be permitted to state
opinions employing legal criteria, and proposifig a procedure to facili-
tate such testimony. After incorporation of these modifications, the
fourth paragraph of the advisory committee's note to Rule 704 would
read as follows:
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bars
so as to admit all opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions
must be helpful to the trier of fact, and Rule 403 provides for
exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions also
stand ready to exclude opinions phrased in terms of inadequately
explored legal criteria. Thus the question, "Did T have capacity to
make a will?" could be excluded within the range of discretion
allowed to the court, while the question, "Did T have sufficient
mental capacity to know the nature and extent of his property and
the natural objects of his bounty and to formulate a rational
scheme of distribution?" would be allowed. McCormick § 12. If,
as in this example, the ultimate application of legal criteria to find-
ings of fact requires only the examination of a list of factors to
determine whether all are present, the opinion of an expert usually
will not assist the trier of fact in making that final step. In other
cases, however, the trier of fact will be required to weigh one or
more factors against one or more opposing factors (e.g., in profes-
sional malpractice, products liability, and other negligence litiga-
tion), follow a chain of intermediate conclusions to an ultimate
409. Id. (citing, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 12 (E. Cleary ed. 1984)).
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conclusion (e.g., in many federal income tax cases), or engage in
other deliberative processes that may be unfamiliar to jurors.
Because the purpose of the Rule is to enable the trier of fact to
consider all information, opinions and conclusions that might
assist it in its deliberations, expert witnesses should be permitted to
express opinions in terms of legal criteria in cases in which the
legal criteria employ concepts unfamiliar to most lay persons or
require complex or abstract reasoning. As a predicate to such tes-
timony, the court should instruct the expert witness and the trier of
fact in the applicable law to ensure that the terms of law employed
by expert witnesses are adequately defined and understood by all
participants in the proceeding. In determining whether to admit
testimony that addresses an ultimate issue, either of fact or of fact
applied to legal criteria, the court should base its decision solely on
whether the testimony will provide information that is useful to the
trier of fact, without giving any weight to the concern that such
testimony may be excessively influential in deciding the ultimate
issue.
MAURY R. OLICKER
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